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ABSTRACT
Both U.S. and English courts has confronted with the concurrent situations mostly
occurring in the cases where 1) the plaintiff asks for the recovery in tort claim despite the
existence of contractual relationship or 2) the plaintiff asserts contract claim but the defendant
contends that the issue at bar should be sound in tort rather than in contract. After studying all
relevant cases and academic writings, this thesis found that both U.S. and English systems
generally recognize concurrent tort claim as an elective right. The courts have attempted to
provide the justified rationales either to allow the plaintiffs tort claim or to apply tort rules
according to the defendant's defense. All rationales given is definitely aimed at significant
aspects including the protection of parties' expectation, the creation of justice, and the
reinforcement of public policy. However, there are also the restrictions on the permissive rule of
concurrent claim. The critical limitations on the rights to tort claim are as follows:
Firstly, because both U.S. and English courts generally recognized that the recovery for
economic loss is limited only in contract claim, plaintiffs' rights to tort claim for pure economic
loss is limited. U.S. law recognized plaintiffs tort claim for economic loss only in the cases of
professional negligence and of bad faith breach of contract. However, some courts are
attempting to develop and apply the independent duty doctrine to permit more tort claims of
negligence especially for economic loss. Furthermore, tort liability for bad faith breach of
contract is mainly limited only in the relationship in insurance contract. To prevent an
opportunistic breach of contract, this thesis suggests that the concept of bad faith breach should
not be limited only in an insurance contract. Similarly, English law invokes the principle of
assumption ofresponsibility that requires the special relationship between the parties in order to
grant the award to the plaintiff who assert concurrent claim of negligence for economic loss.

vi

Secondly, it is clear that under English law, the tortious duty of care can be excluded or
limited by the exculpatory clause or contractual term of liquidated damages. While English
courts refuse to impose the duty of care which is inconsistent with what the parties have agreed
in their contract, it is not apparent that U.S. courts entirely refuse to impose tortious duty of care
which is inconsistent with what the parties have voluntarily agreed in their contract. As to this
approach of English system, this thesis suggests that it would be fair, just and reasonable if U.S.
courts apparently adopt and apply this kind oflimitation to restrict concurrent tort claim in U_.S.
jurisdictions in order to sustain the freedom of contract doctrine which has the dominant aim to
protect the contracting parties' bargain of interest in allocation of their particular risk in the
particular way so far as their interest is not outweighed by the mandatory law or public policy.
Thirdly, it is suggested by scholars' views that the doctrine of efficient breach recognized
in U.S. contract law should be taken into account in limiting the imposition of tort liability on the
breaching party particularly in commercial transaction if breaching party can prove that
nonperformance is economically efficient. This thesis agrees with this suggestion because this
would neither lead to the destruction of well-established concept of efficient breach nor bring
about the unreasonable consequences that cause harm to the public economic interest.
Lastly, some English courts is inclined to limit the scope ofrecoverable damages in
concurrent tort claim by applying the similar test of remoteness of the breach of contract claim to
the tort claim. This restrictive approach aims at the protection of the parties' expectation interest
rather than deterrence the wrongful conduct. As for such reason, this thesis suggests that the
limitation on the scope of recoverable damages is justifiable only in the case where the tortious
duty being imposed by virtue of a contract rather than being imposed by the virtue of provision
under a statute or existing independently of contractual terms.
vii
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Concurrent Claim Situations
Typically, in legal systems around the world, there exist two main sources of obligations
including contract and tort. Both branches of law have played an important role in attempting to
fully compensate the injured parties for a breach of contract and a breach of duties imposed by
law, respectively. Although the laws of contract and tort are separate areas, both have given rise
to complicated concurrent liability issues and, thereby, the issue of concurrent claims has
become prevalent in judicial practices worldwide, occurring in many different contexts,
particularly construction, professional advice, employment, sales of goods and public services.

The core problem relevant to the issue of concurrent claim lies in the legal uncertainties
of the plaintiff’s rights to compensation due to the fact that both the rules of contract law and
those of torts may be applied to determine the damages in the dispute. Especially, when both
requirements for contractual and tortious liability are simultaneously satisfied, the question arises
as to whether tortious liability may be asserted concurrently with liability for a breach of
contract. Stated clearly, it may appear that the contracting party’s conduct not only violates the
express or implied duties set forth in the contractual provisions but may also violate other duties
that are imposed by law. Therefore, it is possible that breach of contractual obligation can give
rise to alternative claims in tort. However, it is well to keep in mind that while there may be
concurrent liability, it is generally the case that a plaintiff will assert a claim in order to recover
for remedies in the alternative. In other words, a plaintiff can seek a remedy under one theory or
the other so that he will not have double recovery for remedies based on both causes of action.

1

While the problems are typically raised when both requirements for contractual and
tortious liability are reached, prior to allowing an alternative right, it is important to examine
whether the contracting party is liable for damages based on tort law. As we can see in tort law,
the tortious liability may be different depending on both the relationship between the parties in
different types of contract and the alleged conduct of the contracting party.
In deciding concurrent cases, courts generally begin by considering the existence of
tortious liability. Though there are different types of contractual disputes such as construction
disputes, malpractice disputes arising from professional services contracts, employment disputes,
sales of goods, and other public services disputes, most of these cases mainly involve claims of
negligence. This is because negligence has been the central basis for liability in most tort cases. 1
Considering the negligence cause of action, the court will particularly consider the problem
regarding the duty of care to determine whether the plaintiff can ask for damages based on
negligence. This thesis will mainly examine the extent to what the scope of duty is imposed in
some kinds of contracts and the limitations on tortious duty owed by the contracting party.
B. An Influence of the Different Rules and Principles to Concurrent Claims
Contractual and tortious liability are dissimilar in many respects, including the
requirement of liability, the scope of remedies, the limitation of action, and the validity of
exculpatory clause. These differences influence plaintiffs’ choices of remedy. This thesis will
explain such differences in order to understand the rules and principles of those core areas of
private law and to address the reasons why the contracting party wants to rely on a tort claim
instead of asserting breach of contract. Normally, the plaintiff prefers to pursue a tort claim, to
1

JOHN L. DIAMOND, LAWRENCE C. LEVINE & ANITA BERNSTEIN, UNDERSTANDING TORTS 46
(4th ed. 2010).
2

some extent, due to the different categories of reasons including (1) broader scope of remedies
(e.g., damages for emotional distress and punitive damages); (2) more favorable limitations
period; (3) getting around a lack of privity; (4) getting around an exculpatory clause.
Additionally, if the plaintiff asserts a tort claim especially when both contractual and tort claim
are pleaded in one suit, the court will inevitably undertake the dilemma responsibility to draw the
principle of concurrency and find the borderline between such causes of action. This thesis will
thereby examine whether the court allows the plaintiff to rely on an alternative tort claim when
he wants some advantages of such claim. This is important because the extent to which the court
allows the plaintiff to rely on a tort theory will affect the scope of remedies acquired by the
plaintiff. Furthermore, the concept and policy of recognition of concurrent claims will be
examined by exploring the historical development of concurrent claims.
C. Relevant Questions and Scope of Study
In terms of the right of the contracting party to bring an alternative tort claim in respect of
the same subject matter, there are two different authorities both in Civil Law system and
Common Law system. The comparison between the two legal systems is definitely worth
studying. However, in this thesis I would start by exploring and comparing U.S. law and English
law as the examples of common law system. Although they have the similar framework of most
of contract and tort law, I found some interesting differences in the conditions and limitations on
concurrent liability between contract and tort that will be illustrated and analyzed in this thesis.
The law of civil law system will definitely be taken into account in my future works in order to
provide a thorough research on concurrent liability between contract and tort.

3

Additionally, under U.S. common law rules, the doctrine of promissory estoppel is used
to protect plaintiffs who had, in their detriment, relied on a defendants’ assurances without the
protection of a formal contract.2 Furthermore, the promissory estoppel is originally applied to
protect plaintiffs who had, in their own detriment, relied on pre-contractual or non-contractual
representation.3 In case of the borderline between tort and contract law, there are some
discussions on pre-contractual liability under U.S. law. It appeared that the doctrine of
promissory estoppel is used to impose tort-like liability for bad faith in a contract context. It is
suggested that the promissory estoppel is related to the situation where the plaintiff is seeking
recovery for loss or damage suffered as the result of reliance on the defendants’ promises or
representations.4 Thus, it is noteworthy that tort liability has interfered the realm of contract law
in the cases where the courts permit the plaintiff to assert promissory estoppel claim for the
damages suffered as a result of his reliance on the defendant’s promise or representation
occurring during pre-contractual period. Undoubtedly, in such situations the plaintiff cannot ask
for contract claim since no contract is actually formed between plaintiff and defendant. All such
situations are very interesting however the doctrine of promissory estoppel as a tort-like liability
will not be studied in this thesis.
As to the scope and objective of this thesis, the important questions are (1) On what
conditions and limitations is the plaintiff permitted to rely on tort claim? (2) What is the rationale
for both excluding and allowing tort claim under the concept of concurrent liability? (3) Which

2

GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT, 70 (Ronald K.L. Collins 2d ed., 1995).

3

See GILMORE, Id. at 80.

4

See GILMORE, Id. at 97.
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approach of both U.S. and English legal system should be taken into account to balance the
interests of both the plaintiff and the defendant as well as of public policy?
This paper will profoundly explore and determine both relevant U.S. and English cases as
well as academic writing with respect to the extent to which the plaintiff is entitled to rely on tort
claim under U.S. and English Law. To begin with, both U.S. and English Law recognize the
existence of concurrent liability in its own conditions based on both the difference of the scope
of contractual and tortious liability and other contexts or circumstances. In brief, under English
law, according to Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd. [1995] 2 AC 145 (HL), the House of
Lords held that a contract between plaintiff and defendant can lead to an “assumption of
responsibility” in tortious liability as long as the contractual terms are “not inconsistent” with a
duty of care, while under U.S. law, case law recognized the existence of a free elective
concurrence. In Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654 (1958), the Supreme
Court of California held that “…it is the rule that where a case sounds both in contract and tort
the plaintiff will ordinarily have freedom of election between an action of tort and one of
contract…” Regarding the foregoing approaches, this thesis will provide comparative analysis
between these two legal regimes. This study will add the element of legal certainty into a legal
system of U.S. and English Law and allow both the courts and lawyers as parts of practical
sectors to consider the certain rights of the plaintiffs under the issue of concurrent liability.
Moreover, from the comparative perspective, this thesis will find what is the qualified right of
the parties in such concurrent cases. Apart from the conditions and limitations that are evidently
recognized by U.S. and English courts, the question whether any other appropriate conditions
and limitations proposed by the scholars should be taken into account to consider the plaintiff’s
right to tort claim in concurrent situation will also be examined.
5

II. THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CONTRACTUAL AND TORTIOUS LIABILITY
This chapter will discuss the contractual liability and tortious liability under U.S. and
English Law in three different aspects. It will mainly concentrate on the differences between the
contract law and tort law on the aspect of the right to remedies rather than the matter of
procedure.

A. Requirements of Liability
Under the adversary system of common law, the plaintiff is mainly permitted and
required to present all relevant facts of the case by filing the complaint describing the facts and
claiming his right against the defendant.5 To recover damages arising from either breach of
contract or tortious conduct, the plaintiff must illustrate the facts by a preponderance of the
evidence to meet all elements of action in order to establish a prima facie case. The requirements
of contract liability are different from liability in tort because of the distinction in the underlying
rules and principles.

1. Elements of Action under U.S. Law
In order to ask for the recovery, the plaintiff has to plead an adequacy of asserting claim
otherwise the complaint will be dismissed. This means that the complaint must allege enough
facts to show that a claim is plausible and not merely conceivable.6 In addition, merely
providing any labels, conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action

5

DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, HORNBOOK ON TORTS 34 (2d ed.
2016).
6

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
6

will not suffice.7 Before considering the rules on concurrence, the elements of contract claim
and tort claim should be identified and explained.

1.1 Elements of a Prima Facie Breach of Contract Case.
First, there must exist the enforceable contract if the contracting parties want to rely on
the contractual rights to remedies. Contract is defined as a promise or a set of promises that the
law will enforce.8 Bargain for exchange is the primary concern for the court to enforce a
promise. When the promisee has given the promisor something in return for exchange, that is
considered as the consideration, courts will be willing to enforce such promise that have been
made by the promisor.9 Accordingly, the contractual obligations are imposed by contract that
the parties intend to be bound. It is clear that neither the remedies for damages nor the remedy
for specific performance is available in case of the breach of an unenforceable contract.10 A few
classes of contracts also require a written memorandum signed by or on behalf of the party to be
charged in order to be enforceable.11 The courts have determined that a failure to satisfy the
requirement of written memorandum merely precludes enforcement of the agreement against
that party.12 Nevertheless, in such case courts generally allow the injured party restitution of
any benefit that he has conferred on the other party by part performance or otherwise.13 The
7

Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008).

8

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH ET AL., CONTRACTS 3 (4th ed. 2004); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 17 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
9

10

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 8 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).

11

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 110, 131 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).

12

See FARNSWORTH ET AL., supra note 9, at 398; see also Herring v. Volume Merch., Inc., 106
S.E.2d 197, 200 (N.C.1958).
13

See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 402.
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Restatement Second of Contracts also added a section stating that “A promise which the
promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promise of
a third person and which does induce the action or forbearance is enforceable notwithstanding
the Statute of Frauds if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.” In such
case the remedy granted for breach is to be limited as justice requires. 14 Some courts reject this
Restatement Second rule while others rely on this rule to add an exception.15 Notably, when the
party acts under a contract that is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds, the contracting
party’s conduct is not considered to be tortious if it occurs without notice of repudiation of such
contract.16 All in all, the most significant limitation on the enforcement of contract is the
requirement of consideration.17

Second, when a breach of contract occurs, the breaching party is liable for the loss
injured by the other party. When performance is due any failure to render it is a breach.18 For
example, the builder who fails in any respect to perform when performance is due has become
liable for breach of contract irrespective of his fault. This is true although the defect is
insubstantial. Even if it is neither willful nor negligent, and even if the builder is unaware of it,
he can be held liable. When the non-breaching party suffered from the breach, he can ask for
the relief but he is still obliged to perform his duty otherwise he will be in breach. The injured

14

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 139 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).

15

See FARNSWORTH ET AL., supra note 9, at 408.

16

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 142 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).

17

See FARNSWORTH ET AL., supra note 9, at 47.

18

See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 535.
8

party can suspend his performance only if the breach is material.19 The courts also allow the
injured party to terminate the contract only after an appropriate length of time has passed.20
Understandably, if the contracting party who is bound by contract refuses to perform his
obligation, he is responsible for the remedial damages that the other party suffers. In the case
when the breach of contract occurs either in the case of nonfeasance or misfeasance21, the
promisor must pay the compensation to the promisee in order to put the promisee in as good a
position as he would have been in had the contract been fully performed. To put the injured
party in the position that he expects to be in is the measure generally used today in actions
founded on promises that are enforceable.22

Third, under the privity doctrine, the plaintiff must be the party to the contract who
suffered from the breach in order to assert contractual claim. The persons other than the parties
of the contract generally cannot enforce the contract although they receive benefits from the
contract. This is because they are not in “privity” with the promisor.23 However, there are some
situations that recognize the right of the intended beneficiary to enforce the contract.24 This is
the reason why the court also encounters the issue of concurrence where the person who suffers
from damages arising out of the contracting party’s conduct is a third person to the contract.
19

See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 562.

20

See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 562.

21

See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 16.

22

See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 46; see also Richard E. Speidel, The Borderland of Contract,
10 N. KY. L. REV. 163, 166 (1982-1983).
23

See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 652; see also Miss. High Sch. Activities Asso. v. Farris, 501
So. 2d 393 (Miss. 1987).
24

See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 657-58; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §
302 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
9

1.2 Elements of a Prima Facie Tortious Case
Intentional torts and negligence are two main categories of tort liability that is based on
wrongdoer’s fault.25 Modern tort law recognizes the strict liability doctrine in a few cases that
impose the tortious liability on the tortfeasor without proof of his fault.26 While tortious liability
is formally based on fault,27 liability in contract is traditionally strict liability.28 Tort liability
based on fault is imposed in accordance with the corrective justice ideals.29 This chapter will
mainly focus on the tort liability that based on faults, in particular, negligence and the tort of
conversion30 because each of those kinds of tort and breach of contract may occur
simultaneously. Moreover, because negligence is an open-ended claim31 which allows the
plaintiff to claim that any defendant’s conduct is acted under standard of care, it is plausible for
plaintiff to establish parallel negligence action. Thus, claims of negligence have always given
rise to complicated concurrent liability issues to be considered.

In order to prevail in tort claim, the plaintiff has to provide the proof of facts that show all
required elements of tort liability. Fundamentally, the certain elements of the separated tort
25

See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 5, at 4.

26

See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, Id. at 5.

27

Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. 292 (1850).

28

See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 5, at 7.

29

See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, Id. at 19.

30

See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, Id. at 107; see also DIAMOND, LEVINE & BERNSTEIN, supra
note 1, at 21. (The tort of conversion is an intentional tort that protects the plaintiff’s possessory
rights in personal property. The defendant will be held being liable for conversion when he
intentionally exercises a substantial control over the tangible personal property, interfering
seriously with the plaintiff’s rights. So conversion can be committed in many different ways
such as dispossession, destruction, and acquiring possession, ownership, or security interests.).
31

See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, Id. at 188.
10

claims are different.32 Additionally, the plaintiff has the burden of proof in tort case.33 In other
words, it is the plaintiff’s duty to provide the evidences and persuade the jury to believe the
weight of his evidences on all elements for tort he claims. Without any valid defense, the
plaintiff will be awarded for damages he claims for.

a. Elements of Negligence Tort
We can see the rules of tort in negligence case that the plaintiff must prove the duty of
care owed by the defendant and the failure of exercising reasonable standard of care under the
circumstances.34 The duty of care may arise or base upon the existence of a contract, a statute, or
common law.35 Furthermore, the ordinary rule of negligence is that negligent liability lies on the
defendant only when the plaintiff can prove the legally recognized harms from which he
suffers.36 Claims for negligence always need proof of actual harm.37 This element of actual
harms in negligence action differs from that of some kinds of intentional tort such as battery,
assault, fault imprisonment and differs from contract action.38

Considering Duke & Co. v. Anderson, 275 Pa. Super. 65, 418 A.2d 613 (1980) as an
example of legal malpractice claim, in this case the court provided the rule as to the burden of

32

See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, Id. at 38.

33

See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, Id. at 39.

34

See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, Id. at 42.

35

See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, Id. at 204.

36

See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, Id. at 29.

37

See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, Id. at 189; see also Reardon v. Larkin, 3 A.3d 376 (Me.
2010).
38

See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, Id. at 54.
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proof in concurrent claim either when the plaintiff sues in contract action or in tort. The rules of
law provided in this case are (1) in a legal malpractice action, the plaintiff has a choice between
suing the attorney in assumpsit (contract) or in trespass (tort) and (2) the plaintiff is required to
prove an essential element of actual loss for legal malpractice, whichever form of action the
plaintiff chooses between assumpsit or trespass. The development of the law in legal
malpractice case required the element of actual loss because many jurisdictions treat legal
malpractice action as sounding in tort.

Apart from the foregoing elements, the proof of causations in fact and in law are also
required. Particularly, to consider the scope of liability for negligence (proximate causation), the
court usually applies the foreseeability tests by holding that defendant is liable for all kinds of
harms the defendant foreseeably risked by defendant’s negligent conduct.39

Stated briefly, the plaintiff has the burden of proof of facts and persuasion on negligence
case. All elements required are (1) the duty owned by defendant to exercise the ordinary
standard of reasonable care in order to avoid risky harms to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant’s
breach of duty of care by acting in unreasonable risky conduct; (3) the actual harms to the
plaintiff in fact caused by defendant’s conduct (but-for test); (4) the proximate cause of the
plaintiff’s harms that shows a significant relationship between the defendant’s conduct and the
harms suffered by the plaintiff, and (5) the existence and the amount of damages.40

39

See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, Id. at 339.

40

See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, Id. at 197-98.
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b. Elements of Tort of Conversion
Conversion is one kind of intentional tort that may be simultaneously asserted together
with breach of contract. It appears that the court at times held that breach of the bailment
contract is a conversion.41 The tort recovery of conversion in bailment case must inevitably
consider the effects of the bailment contract when the contract is the foundation of the
bailment.42 For claiming of conversion, the plaintiff must prove the defendant’s intent to
exercise substantial control over the plaintiff’s possession of the tangible property.43 In many
cases, the bailee as the defendant in tort of conversion case has the burden of proof on his
innocence in failing to return the bailed goods.44

2. Elements of Action under English Law
Similarly, to consider the scope of concurrent liability under English law, we should
examine the elements of contract claim and tort claim as well. In doing so, we can explore and
identify whether any requirements imposed by English law are different from those of U.S. law.

See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, Id. at 118; see also Fotos v. Firemen’s Ins. Co., 533 A.2d
1264 (D.C. 1987); S/M Indus., Inc. v. Hapag-Lloyd A.G., 586 So. 2d 876 (Ala. 1991).
41

See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, Id. at 119. (Tort law respects the bailor’s possessionownership rights and allows him to recover damages or the goods themselves against a bailee
who converts bailed goods by non-return or otherwise. For example, when the bailee does not
return the goods, conversion claim can be asserted against the bailee.).
42

43

See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, Id. at 107.

44

See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, Id. at 118; see also Kearns v. McNeill Bros. Moving &
Storage Co., 509 A.2d 1132 (D.C. 1986); Procter & Gamble Distrib. Co. v. Lawrence Am. Field
Warehousing Corp., 213 N.E.2d 873 (N.Y.1965).
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2.1 Elements of a Prima Facie Breach of Contract Case.
First and foremost, the crucial element is the existence of a contract that is supported by
consideration or made by deed. Such contract must be certain and complete. In order to
establish the binding contract, the parties must intend to create the legal relations.45
Fundamentally, the parties to a contract are free to determine the terms of a contact under the
theory of freedom of contract.46 However, some contractual terms will be restricted for the
policy reasons.47 Additionally, the contract must comply with any formal requirement needed
for some agreements to be legally binding. But the requirement of the particular forms is merely
the exception in limited contracts such as a contract for the sale or other disposition of an interest
in land.48 In essence, the need of consideration is required as a significant element of exchange
for the enforceable contract under English law unless such contract is made by deed.49
Secondly, if the party fails to perform his obligation under the terms of contract, such
party would be liable for breach of contract unless there exists an exculpatory clause. 50 The
party may commit the breach without fault unless the express or implied terms of contract
required the use of reasonable care when the party performs the contractual obligation, such as
the obligations undertaken by a professional in respect of services for a client.51 Even though the
law of contract is the different concept in comparison to the law of tort, it is not true that English
45

ANDREW BURROWS, A RESTATEMENT OF THE ENGLISH LAW OF CONTRACT 44 (2016).

46

See BURROWS, Id. at 48.

47

See BURROWS, Id. at 49.

48

See BURROWS, Id. at 73; see also Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989, c. 34,
§ 2 (Eng.).
49
See BURROWS, Id. at 62-63.
50

See BURROWS, Id. at 107.

51

See BURROWS, Id. at 108.
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law deny tort claim that arise in a contractual context.52 This will be considerably described in
chapter five.
Thirdly, under the privity of contract doctrine, only the parties to the contract who can
either enforce or be enforced under the contractual relationship. 53 In general, the third party
cannot enforce the contract. Nevertheless, there are the exceptions to privity rule, in particular,
the exception is set out in the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999.54 Moreover, the
privity rule allows the promisee to enforce the contract although such contract is one for the
benefit of a third party. However, the recoverable damages will be nominal.55 The Contracts
(Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 recognizes a third party’s own right to directly enforce the
terms of the contract on the condition that 1) the contract expressly provides that he may; or 2)
the term of contract purports to confer a benefit on him unless there is the proper interpretation
of the contract that the parties did not intend the third party to have that right.56 Therefore, the
third party shall be entitled to any remedies that would have been available to him in an action
for breach of contract if he had been a party to the contract.57 It is noteworthy that the promisee
is still entitled to enforce any terms of the contract because the right of the third party is merely
additional to the right of the promisee.58 The “circumventions of the privity” is acceptable under

52

See BURROWS, Id. at 45.

53

See BURROWS, Id. at 240.

54

See BURROWS, Id. at 241.

55

See BURROWS, Id. at 241-42; see also Beswick v. Beswick [1968] AC 58 (HL) (appeal taken
from Eng.).
56

Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, c. 31, § 1(1) (Eng.).

57

Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, c. 31, § 1 1(5) (Eng.).

58

Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, c. 31, § 4 (Eng.).
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English law.59 It has appeared that English common law allows the third party to bring an action
for the tort of negligence instead of bringing an action for breach of contract in the case where
the party’s breach of contract concurrently constitutes the breach of duty of care owned by the
contracting party to the third party.60

2.2 Elements of a Prima Facie Tortious Case
Apart from the common law on tort, there are the statutory protections. However, all
statutes play only the supplementary role.61 Because tortious duty is imposed by law itself, 62
tortious liability is distinguished from contractual liability.63 The content of the tortious duty is
fixed by law whereas that of the contractual duty is fixed by both the contract itself and the
law.64 However, the intent of the defendant in undertaking the responsibilities for certain
conduct may lead to the existence of a negligence duty.65 Similar to U.S. tort law, tort liability
may base upon fault such as intentional tort and negligence and may be the strict liability. 66
Generally speaking, most torts require proof of foreseeable damages as the consequence of

59

See BURROWS, supra note 45, at 248.

60

See BURROWS, Id. at 248; see also White v. Jones [1995] 2 AC 207 (HL) (appeal taken from
Eng.).
61

JOHN FREDERIC CLERK & ANTHONY M. DUGDALE, CLERK & LINDSELL ON TORTS ¶ 1-18 (19th
ed. 2006).
62

PERCY HENRY WINFIELD, WINFIELD AND JOLOWICZ ON TORT 4 (W. V. H. Rogers 11th ed
Sweet & Maxwell, 1979).
63

See WINFIELD, Id. at 4.

64

See WINFIELD, Id. at 5.

65

See CLERK & DUGDALE, supra note 61, ¶ 1-03.

66

See WINFIELD, supra note 62, at 43.
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defendant’s conduct except for trespass to land, to person or to goods which are the forms of
intentional torts that are considered to be the torts actionable per se.67

a. Elements of Negligence Tort
In case of negligence, the elements of claim are (1) defendant’s legal duty owed to the
plaintiff to exercise the standard of care; (2) defendant’s breach of duty; (3) the causation
element that require the connection between the negligent conduct and damages and (4) the
foreseeability of consequential damages. 68 As for the third and the forth elements, the plaintiff
has to show that plaintiff’ damages are caused by the defendant’s breach of duty and such kind
of damages are not too remote.69 In other words, the elements of causation including causation
in fact and causation in law are also required.70 Therefore, the plaintiff must prove that the
harms suffered would not occurred but for there has been the negligent conduct and such harms
has been foreseen by the reasonable man.71 The plaintiff will lose the negligence case if he fails
on the burden of proving the causation.72 In contrast, in case of conversion and strict liability,
the causation requirement has followed from the nature of the tort.73

67

See WINFIELD, Id. at 447; see also CLERK & DUGDALE, supra note 61, ¶ 1-44.

68

See WINFIELD, supra note 62, at 66.

69

See WINFIELD, Id. at 109; see also CLERK & DUGDALE, supra note 61, ¶ 8-04.

70

See WINFIELD, Id. at 110; see also CLERK & DUGDALE, Id. ¶ 2-01; JEB Fasteners Ltd. v. Marks
Bloom & Co. [1983] 1 All ER 583 (appeal taken from Eng.).
71

See WINFIELD, Id. at 116-17; see also CLERK & DUGDALE, Id. ¶ 2-06; Overseas Tankship
(U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Enginerring Co. Ltd. (The Wagon Mound) [1961] AC 388 (appeal
taken from Aus.)
72

See CLERK & DUGDALE, Id. ¶ 2-06.

73

See CLERK & DUGDALE, Id. ¶ 2-08.
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Tort claim for recovering any damages arising from unsafe product may be asserted
either in negligence or product liability action. If the plaintiff seeks for liability in negligence, he
must prove all elements needed specially proving breach of standard of care owes to the plaintiff.
However, if the plaintiff as a consumer asserts the product liability action, the defendant’s
liability will be governed by the Consumer Protection Act 1987. Under Act of 1987, the
defendant may be liable to the consumer for damages arising out of the unsafe products although
neither the intentional or negligent conduct can be found on the part of defendant.74 So in this
strict liability tort action, the plaintiff do not have to prove defendant’s fault but must prove that
the injury arises from the defective product to assert product liability action.75 Notably, the
plaintiff can assert tort claim to recover only for damages injured to plaintiff or to other
properties not the product itself.76

b. Elements of Tort of Conversion
Conversion is a kind of unlawful appropriation of another’s chattel.77 When the plaintiff
can prove that defendant unjustifiably deny the plaintiff’s rights or defendant wrongfully assert
his right over the goods in a way inconsistent with the plaintiff’s rights such as taking, disposing,
damaging, or destroying the goods, the defendant may be committed by conversion if the

74

See CLERK & DUGDALE, Id. ¶ 1-59.

75

See CLERK & DUGDALE, Id. ¶ 1-59; see also Consumer Protection Act 1987, c. 43, §§ 2-3
(Eng.).
76

See CLERK & DUGDALE, Id. ¶ 11-02; see also Consumer Protection Act 1987, c. 43, § 5(1)(2)
(Eng.).
77

JOHN MURPHY, STREET ON TORTS 258 (12th ed. 2007). (The tort of conversion protects the
plaintiff’s possession or the right to immediate possession. If the defendant intentionally deals
with goods that is seriously inconsistent with the plaintiff’s possession or the right to immediate
possession, he will be committed by conversion.).
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defendant deliberately takes such conduct.78 So the intent of the defendant to take such wrongful
conduct is needed to hold the defendant being liable for conversion. Considering bailment
situation,79 the plaintiff must prove the degree of departure from the contractual terms of the
bailment in order to convince that bailee’s conduct amounts to conversion.80 For instance, the
carrier commits a conversion when he, in breach of contract with the consignor, delivers the
goods to the consignee and it appears that such delivery leads to the destruction of the
consignor’s lien.81

B. Scope of Remedies
The plaintiff may have a higher quantum of damages in tort claim than in contractual
claim or vice versa. This depends on some differences on several aspects including the measures
of damages, the recoverable damages, and the limitations on damages.

1. Scope of Remedies under U.S. Law
It is generally stated that the recoverable remedies in the case of breach of contract is
different from those in tort case because their aims of compensation differ from each other. Such
distinction may lead to the need of bringing concurrent tort claim.

78

See WINFIELD, supra note 62, at 449; see also CLERK & DUGDALE, Id. ¶¶ 17-07-08.

79

See CLERK & DUGDALE, Id. ¶ 17-07; see also Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977, c. 32,
§ 2(2) (Eng.).
80

See WINFIELD, supra note 62, at 452; see also MURPHY, supra note 77, at 259.

81

See CLERK & DUGDALE, supra note 61, ¶ 17-18; see also Sze Hai Tong Bank Ltd. v. Rambler
Cycle Co. Ltd. [1959] AC 576 (appeal taken from Sing.).
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1.1 Damages for Contract Liability
In general, contract law rejects to mandate the contracting party to perform his duty as he
promises.82 Contract remedies are aimed at providing the relief to promisees who suffer from
breach of contract.83 Therefore, the court generally provides the legal remedy which is a judicial
remedy awarding a sum of money rather that giving the equitable remedy that is a judicial order
either requiring specific performance or enjoining its nonperformance.84 This chapter will not
look at the equitable remedies that are not usual under common law system in detail but will
focus on the pecuniary damages that are the usual form of relief85 in order to compare with
remedies in tort. Generally speaking, when the breach of contract occurs, the court grants the
non-breaching party a relief by awarding a sum of money intended to compensate for the harm
to his interest. To grant the recovery for types of damages available in contract claim, courts
normally apply the appropriate measure of damages. In such cases, the concept of efficient
breach may be considered. Additionally, courts will consider whether there are any limitations
on damages that have an effect on the quantity of damages asked by the plaintiff.

a. The Measures of Damages and Recoverable Remedies
Before looking at the types of damages available, we should consider the measures of
damages that are usually applied in contract claim. The measures of damages causing from
breach of contract are in the forms of the protection of promisee’s expectation, reliance and

82

See FARNSWORTH ET AL., supra note 9, at 730.

83

See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 730.

84

See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 735.

85

See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 739.
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restitution interests.86 In order to protect expectation interest, the court tries to put the injured
party in as good a position as it would have been in had the contract been performed.87 This
measure of damage will give the injured party the benefits of its bargain that is measured based
on the actual value.88 This kind of measurement requires the element of causation which is
similar to the requirement of action in tort. Thus, this element in contract requires the evidences
showing that breach of contract is the cause in fact of all loss.89 In addition, the limitations on
damages including the foreseeability, and certainty of loss are also considered.90 Because the
limitations on damages may operate differently in the contract versus the tort context, this may
lead to the plaintiff’s preferable choice in asserting his claim. Alternatively, the court will
protect the promisee’s reliance by putting the promisee back in the position in which such party
would have been had the contract not been made. This will occur when the promisee has
changed position in reliance on the contract by incurring expenses in preparation or in
performance.91 The reliance interest is ordinarily smaller than the expectation interest because
the expectation interest includes both loss of profits and the reliance but the reliance interest
includes nothing for lost profits.92 The reliance interest also requires the causation element.93

86

See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 46.

87

See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 730.

88

See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 730; see also L. L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The
Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1, 46 YALE L. J. 52 (1936-1937).
See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 731; see also Wright v. St. Mary’s Med. Ctr., Inc., 59 F. Supp.
2d 794 (S.D. Ind. 1999).
89

90

See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 732; see also Wright, 59 F. Supp. 2d 794.

91

See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 732; see also Fuller & Perdue, supra note 88, at 52.

92

See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 733.

93

See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 733.
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The court sometimes recognized the restitution interest to the injured party in order to prevent
unjust enrichment but not to enforce the promise.94 This damage category tries to put the
breaching party back in the position in which such party would have been had the contract not
been made.95 In other words, the injured party can recover all money or services that the
breaching party has received before breaching the contract.96 The restitution interest is smaller
than both expectation interest and reliance interest.97

As for the main measure of damage in protecting expectation interest, either in the case
of total breach of contract or partial breach, the injured party may generally claim for loss of
expectation interest including 1) loss in value; 2) other loss such as incidental and consequential
damages.

A contract claim and a tort claim have a difference in the rights to type of damages. For
instance, the right to pure economic loss is allowed in a typical breach of contract while
damages for pain and suffering or mental distress are recoverable in tort. Punitive damages are
available in tort but generally not in contract. Apart from considering the measures of damages,
we will also consider some types of damages that are mainly available in tort claim but such
types are either restricted or refused in contract claim. These types of damages are damages for
mental or emotional distress, and punitive damages. This can show that the plaintiff may choose
to sue in tort rather than in contract in order to recover such types of damages. In addition, the

94

See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 733.

95

See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 733.

96

See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 733.

97

See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 734.
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rights to pure economic loss, that is generally available in contract claim, will be explored as the
concept of limiting the imposition of tort liability to the party.

Damages that result from mental distress are sometimes recoverable. Contract law does
not allow the recovery of emotional disturbance unless 1) the breach causes bodily harm or 2)
even without bodily harm, “the contract or the breach is of such a kind that serious emotional
disturbance was a particularly likely result.”98 Some courts also allow the recovery for mental
distress in the case where the breach of contract amounts to a tort.99

The right to punitive damage under contract law is severely restricted. In general, courts
will not award punitive damages intended to punish the breaching party because the main goal
of contract remedy is to compensate the injured party for his expectation.100 Punitive damages
may, however, be awarded in tort actions, and a number of courts have awarded them for a
breach of contract that is tortious in some respects.101 Some courts impose punitive damages
when the breach of contract is accompanied by an independent tort, at least if the conduct is
sufficiently outrageous to justify such damages.102 However, when plaintiff’s right is limited to

98

See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 810; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353
(AM. LAW INST. 1981).
99

See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 810; see also Chung v. Kaonohi Ctr. Co., 618 P.2d 283 (Haw.
1980).
100

See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 760.

101

See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 761; see also Cheney v. Palos Verdes Inv. Corp., 665 P.2d 661
(Idaho 1983); Kuhn v. Coldwell Banker Landmark, Inc., 245 P.3d 992 (Idaho 2010).
102

See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 761; see also Excel Handbag Co. v. Edison Bros. Stores, Inc.,
630 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1980).
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damages available in contract action because of the economic loss rule, punitive damage is not
recoverable because plaintiff cannot recover tort damages.103

Notably, some court held that the characterization of the cause of action found in either
breach of contract (breach of warranty) or negligence is not determined by the question as to
whether the types of remedy sought are one that is available for contract of tort.104 Other courts
held that the types of the remedy sought influences the court in determining the cause of action
and the choice of applicable limitation period.105

b. The Concept of Efficient Breach
U.S. contract law recognizes an efficient breach. That is to say that nonperformance is
economically efficient when the benefits gained by the breaching party are greater than the value
of the loss to the other party.106 Therefore, under economic analysis, nonperformance and its
consequent reallocation of resources is socially desirable.107 It is important to consider the
concept of efficient breach in U.S. contract law. This is because this concept may have an
influence on the scope of remedies granting to the plaintiff especially when the courts consider
whether the punitive damages should be granted to the plaintiff. Generally, punitive damages

103

See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 5, at 1080; see also Richard Swaebe v. Sears
World Trade, 639 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Tietsworth v. Harley-Davidson, Inc.,
677 N.W.2d 233 (Wis. 2004).
104

CALVIN W. CORMAN, LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 199 (1991); see also W. Elec. Co. v. Brenner,
41 N.Y.2d 291 (1977).
105

See CORMAN, Id. at 199; see also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Enco Assocs., 43 N.Y.2d 389
(1977); Dantagnan v. I. L. A. Local 1418, 496 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1974).
106

See FARNSWORTH ET AL., supra note 9, at 736.

107

See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 736.
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would not be awarded in breach of contract especially in efficient breach.108 In addition, it is
possible that the doctrine of efficient breach may be taken into account in limiting the imposition
of tort liability to the breaching party, in particular, in commercial transaction.
c. The Limitations on Damages
When the plaintiff claims for damages suffered from the defendant’s breach of contract,
the court will consider what are the recoverable damages in contract case. Moreover, plaintiff’s
amount of damages available may be reduced because the recoverable damages are also
subjected to the limitations such as those of avoidability, foreseeability and certainty.109
Normally, the limitations on damages are taken into account in the process of considering the
amount of recoverable damages. Thus, the explanation of the different scope of remedies
between contract claim and tort claim should be focused on the limitations on damages as well.
Particularly, when it appears that such limitations may operate differently in the contract claim
and tort claim. There are three limitations on the recovery of damages for breach of contract
including avoidability, foreseeability, and the requirement of certainty.110 All three limitations
result in the reduction in the amount of damages recoverable under the general concept that
protects the promisee’s expectation.111 Under the avoidability limitation, the injured party is
precluded from recovering damages for any loss that he could take appropriate steps to avoid
such loss.112 The party in breach generally has the burden of prove that the injured party does

108

See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 737.

109

See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 764-66.

110

See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 759-60.

111

See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 760.

112

See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 779.
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not take appropriate steps to mitigate its loss.113 Under the limitation of foreseeability, if the
party in breach, at the time of making the contract, did not have reason to foresee a probable loss
that does not arise naturally from the breach – that is the consequential damage, such party is not
liable for such damages.114 This reasonable contemplation requirement for the recovery of
consequential damages restricts the scope of remedies that are allowed for breach of contract.
The restriction of foreseeability is severer than that for the recovery of damages in tort claim
which is upon the proximate cause test.115 Under uncertainty limitation, damages for breach of
contract must be clearly proved with certainty and such damages cannot be merely left to
speculation.116 Nevertheless, any breach gives the injured party a claim for damages. This
means that even though the injured party suffers from no loss or the amount of loss that is not
prove with sufficient certainty, such party can recover at least nominal damages.117 In addition
to this, the reasonable certainty is recognized in the recent decades.118

113

See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 780.

114

See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 792-93; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §
351 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
115

See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 794; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435 (AM.
LAW INST. 1979).
116

See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 800; see also Griffin v. Colver, 16 N.Y. 489 (1858).

117

See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 757; see also Chung v. Kaonohi Ctr. Co., 618 P.2d 283 (Haw.
1980).
118

See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 800; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352
(AM. LAW INST. 1981).
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Notably, the requirement of certainty for recover damages in breach of contract is still
more strictly applied than that for recover damages in tort claim.119

d. The Enforceability of Liquidated Remedy
It is necessary to consider the validity and enforceability of the provision of liquidated
damages. This is because the amount of recoverable damages in contract claim may be limited
by parties’ agreement on the relief for breach of contract. Under U.S. contract law, the court
gives the parties to the contract the power to agree about the relief for breach of contract.120
However, their power to bargain over their right to remedies is limited.121 On one hand, if the
parties have agreed that so large amount of damages are payable under their agreement, such
agreement being categorized as “penalty” is denied under the law of remedies for breach of
contract and the injured party is remitted to the conventional damage remedy.122 On the other
hand, if the agreement of the remedial right is enforceable as liquidated damages, damages to the
sum given are limited and the parties are bound by such agreement.123 It is acceptable that if the
amount of damages is , at the time of contracting, reasonably stipulated in the light of the

119

See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 800; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 912 (AM.
LAW INST. 1979).
120

See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 810.

121

See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 811.

122

See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 811-13.

123

See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 811-13.
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anticipated or actual loss caused by the breach and of the difficulties of proving loss, such sum of
damages is characterized as liquidated damages and enforceable.124

Recently, the rule under U.S. system has not been clearly seen whether or not the
provision of the liquidated damages excludes or limits the concurrent tortious liability.

1.2 Damages for Tortious Liability
a. The Measures of Damages and Recoverable Remedies
As to the measures of damages, tort law has intended to compensate the injured person
who suffers from legally recognized harms by awarding damages to the plaintiff against the
defendant who is the wrongdoer.125 So the plaintiff’s primary goal is to be awarded the
monetary damages as a compensation of harms suffered.126 In comparison to the type of
damages recoverable in contract claim, the court is highly inclined to allow the damages for
emotional distress and punitive damages in tort claim. Damages for emotional distress are
broadly recoverable when plaintiff establishes the right to recover for emotional harm as one
item of damages under ordinary negligence action that also caused other physical injuries.127 A
punitive damage is also allowed in some circumstances in order to deter further wrongful
act,128for instance it is traditionally allowed when the defendant’s conduct is outrageous.129

124

See FARNSWORTH ET AL., Id. at 814; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356
(AM. LAW INST. 1981).
125

See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 5, at 4.

126

See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, Id. at 4.

127

See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, Id. at 699-700.

128

See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, Id. at 4.
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Claim for damages for pain, suffering, and emotional distress as well as punitive damages130 are
allowed as the open-ended without any measurement. While the plaintiff is likely to be awarded
at large sums of money,131damages caps are imposed in some states.132
As to the recovery for economic loss, it is likely that the plaintiff’s rights to such loss are
broadly protected in contract claim. The right to economic loss is harshly restricted in tort
action. The economic loss is likely limited under the rule of negligence unless economic harm is
an item of damages in negligence suit.133 In terms of pure economic loss, the court is likely to be
concerned to preserve the role of contract and exclude the tort claim for pure economic loss.134
Claim of negligence for pure economic loss is actionable in the case where the court held that
there exists a special contractual relationship between parties such as the relationship between
the lawyer and client so that defendant owned the duty of care to the plaintiff.135 This make the
legal malpractice ordinarily treated as an economic tort that causes financial harm without injury
to person or to property.136
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In conclusion, the scope of damages awards in negligence case mainly comprise of 1)
physical harm to person including pecuniary losses such as lost wages or lost earnings, medical
expenses, pain and suffering as well as damages for emotional distress and 2) physical damages
to tangible property.137 Significantly, all preceding damages would be awarded only if these
damages meet the requirement of foreseeability.138

Turning to consider the recoverable remedies in the tort of conversion, subject to the
valid limitation on liability the parties have agreed, the plaintiff can recover for monetary
damages at the market value of the goods at the time and place of conversion except for the case
that the value of converted goods fluctuates.139 Additionally, damages for loss of use,
consequential damages140, and punitive damages are allowed in conversion action. Contrary to
negligence case, when plaintiff cannot prove the actual damage in conversion case, the sums of
nominal damages are also allowed.141

b. The Limitations on Damages
As being stated before, the limitations on damages have an effect on the amount of
damages. The relevant limitations on damages in tort claim are thus worthy of being considered
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(Ark.2007).
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in order to illustrate the different scope of remedies that has an influence on the plaintiff’s choice
of tort claim rather than contract claim or vice versa. The contributory negligence, plaintiff’s
assumption of risk, and the mitigation of damages rule are concerned as the limitations. In
negligence case, in most states the defendant may raise the affirmative defense including either
the plaintiff’s fault (comparative negligence) or plaintiff’s assumption of risk to reduce damage.
Similarly, there is the mitigation of damages rule under tort law.142 This rule requires that the
plaintiff should take the reasonable care or expenditure to avoid damages suffered. The recovery
for damages that could be avoided will be denied under this rule.143 And plaintiff can recover for
any reasonable expenditure he incurs in mitigation of damages.144

2. Scope of Remedies under English Law
Similar to U.S. law, there exists a distinction on remedies in some respects between
contract claim and tort claim. The profound study on this distinction will lead to the
understanding on concurrent claim under English law which is discussed in chapter five.
2.1 Damages for Contract Liability
Under the general law of remedies for breach of contract, when the breach of contract
occurs by one party, the other party has the right to terminate the contract in order to end the
contractual relationship.145 When the party chooses to terminate the contract, such party can be
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awarded damages for breach as well.146 Where one party commits a breach of contract, the
injured party has a right to compensatory damages for the loss caused by the breach.147

a. The Measures of Damages and Recoverable Remedies
The compensatory damages are normally in the form of a monetary damages and
generally provided equivalent to the loss arising from the breach.148 Specific performance is
allowed as an equitable remedy.149 Specific performance is unusual for a common law country
so it is thought of as a secondary remedy to compensatory damages under English law.150
Considering the measures of damages, contract law on remedies aims at putting the injured party
into as good a position as when the contract had been performed to protect the injured party’s
expectation interest.151 Alternatively, the injured party can seek for the reliance damages instead
of the expectation interest to reach the overall aim of compensatory damages.152

In terms of recoverable remedies under English contract law, compensatory damages are
generally concerned to compensate pecuniary loss while the non-pecuniary loss such as “mental

146

See BURROWS, Id. at 111.

147

See BURROWS, Id. at 120.

148

See BURROWS, Id. at 120.

149

See BURROWS, Id. at 149.

150

See BURROWS, Id. at 150.

151

ANDREW BURROWS, REMEDIES FOR TORTS AND BREACH OF CONTRACT 33 (3th ed. 2004).

152

See BURROWS, supra note 45, at 123.
32

distress” is not recoverable.153 However, personal injury such as damages for pain and suffering
can be awarded even though the plaintiff almost always seeks for such damages in tort.154

The mental distress for breach of contract claim has been allowed by the court in some
exceptional cases where the mental satisfaction is an important object of the contract155 It
appears that the court applies the approach that considers the mental satisfaction being as the
important object of the contract to allow the mental distress in the case where the claim was
brought against the defendant both in contract and tortious negligence.156

The recovery for economic loss is normally based on contract claim. The remoteness test
is also required and based on the kind of loss that is in the defendant’s reasonable contemplation.
It is held that the contemplation of economic loss in contract claim required a greater degree of
probability than the foresight test in tort.157

Punitive damages cannot be awarded for breach of contract under English contract law.158
This is contrary to tort law that allows punitive damages where the facts meet the requirements
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imposed in Rookes v. Barnard [1964] AC 1129 (HL). For example, the punitive damages could
be awarded in case where the defendant has calculated to make a profit for himself which greatly
exceed the compensation payable to the plaintiff.159

b. The Limitations on Damages
There are also the limits on compensatory damages.160 The defendant has the burden of
proof on the limitations of compensatory damages.161 The first one of limits is the remoteness
restriction.162 If, at the time the contract was made, the defendant has not been reasonably
contemplated whatever type of loss as a serious possibility, that kind of loss is too remote.163
Second, the defendant is not responsible for the loss where an intervening cause either a natural
event, a third party’s conduct or the plaintiff’s conduct breaks the chain of causation.164 This
means that the intervening cause is much more responsible for loss than the defendant’s
breach.165 Third, the plaintiff is required to take reasonable steps to mitigate damages.166 If the
plaintiff fails to take the reasonable steps to minimize the loss, he cannot recover such
damages.167 Forth, the law on contributory negligence is, in practice, applied as the limitation of
damages for breach of contract as a matter of statutory interpretation of the Law Reform
159
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(Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 which raised by courts.168 In addition, contributory
negligence is applicable to the case where the breach of contractual duty of care also
simultaneously meet the requirement of the independent tort of negligence.169 In particular, in
the case of concurrent liability in contract and tort, it is submitted that the plaintiff should not be
able to avoid the contributory rule by choosing to assert contract claim.170 As a result, damages
will be reduced, not eliminated, “to such extent as the court thinks just and equitable having
regard to the plaintiff’s share in the responsibility for the damage.”171
c. The Enforceability of Liquidated Remedy
Similar to the U.S. contract law the validity and enforceability of the provision of
liquidated damages may affect the amount of recoverable damages in contract claim. It thus
important to consider whether the agreement on the sum of money being the damages payable is
valid and enforceable or not. Under English contract law, parties are allowed to include a term
in the contract in order to stipulate for the sum of money to be the damages payable in the case of
breach.172 Such term is enforceable as the “liquidated damages” if it is not the penalty. The
stipulated sum of damages is not a penalty if it is, in the time of contracting, estimated to protect
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a legitimate interest of the plaintiff and it does not exceed all proportion to such interest. 173 It is
noteworthy that where the breaching party is a consumer, the stipulated term may be invalid if it
is considered to be unfair under the Consumer Rights Act 2015.174

2.2 Damages for Tortious Liability
a. The Measures of Damages and Recoverable Remedies
Tort law aims at compensation so that the rules on damage try to “put the plaintiff in the
position he would have been in had the tort not been committed.”175 Hence, the remedy in tort
rule generally provides an award of unliquidated damages.176 While tort law protects the wide
range of interest against the wrongfully conduct, the compensatory damage is particularly
focused for tort negligence.177 Significantly, personal interests such as the rights to bodily
integrity, personal liberty, physical security from injury, psychiatric harm and distress are mainly
protected by either intentional tort, negligence and strict liability in many cases.178 Property
interest such as the rights to possession, physical damage to property are also protected by both
intentional tort, such as conversion, and negligence.179
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Claims for personal injury are mostly available in tortious action but they can also be
recoverable in claims for breach of contract.180 Taking damages in medical negligence cases as
an example, in general, the court applies the measure of damage in claim for personal injury to
the medical cases. Damages for mental distress is also revocable in some circumstances.181
Moreover, there is the view that damages for mental distress should be awarded both in tort
claim and breach of contract claim although courts have traditionally been reluctant in awarding
mental distress for breach of contract.182

According to English law, it is generally clear that it is insufficient for plaintiff to recover
damages if he suffers only economic loss arising from defendant’s negligent conduct.183
However, pure economic loss resulting from negligent conduct is also protected by tort law in
some situations. The recovery of damages for pure economic loss in tort claim has restricted and
then has developed through the tort of negligent misrepresentation case that allowing the
recovery of pure economic loss.184 In Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller & Partners Ltd. [1964]
AC 465 (HL), court allowed the recovery for wasted expenditure in negligent misrepresentation
action because the special relationship between the plaintiff and defendant created the
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defendant’s duty to safeguard the plaintiff’s economic interest.185 And after Hedley Byrne’s
case, in some limited situations, there are the recognitions that the plaintiff can recover for pure
economic loss arising from the acts or omissions under the tort of negligence.186 For instance, it
is common that where the solicitor negligently provides services to the client, the client can
recover for the loss of chance of litigating of recovering compensation.187 So, the requirement of
special relationship is needed to award pure economic loss in tort claim.188 However, when the
defendant asserted the tort claim for economic loss arising from the defendant’s breach of
contract, it is arguable that the court should apply the narrower contractual test of remoteness in
order to grant the right to such damages.189

Considering the recoverable remedies for conversion case, the Torts (Interference with
Goods) Act 1977 Section 3 provides that the plaintiff can ask for either form of relief as
followed:
“(a) an order for delivery of the goods, and for payment of any consequential
damages, or
(b) an order for delivery of the goods, but giving the defendant the alternative of
paying damages by reference to the value of the goods, together in either
alternative with payment of any consequential damages, or
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(c) damages.”
Punitive damages are restrictively awarded in only two classes of case to punish the
defendant and to deter him from the same conduct in the future.190 The first is that the punitive
damages are recoverable where there is the “oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional action by
servants of the Government.”191 Secondly, in the case “where the defendant’s conduct has been
calculated by him to make a profit for himself which may well exceed the compensation payable
to the plaintiff,” the court will allow the punitive damages.192

b. The Limitations on Damages
The recovery for damages in tort claim is under some limitations such as the test of
remoteness, duty of mitigation and contributory negligence. First, the test of remoteness as a
causation requirement is considered to limit damages for which the defendant is responsible.193
If damages would not normally be anticipated or such damages occurred in an unusual way, that
type of damage is considered to remote and then the defendant is not held responsible. As can be
seen, the rules on remoteness are traditionally more advantageous to the plaintiffs in tort than in
contract.194 Second, it is excepted that the amount of recoverable damages is also governed by
the rule of mitigation of damage that requires the plaintiff to mitigate his loss by taking
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reasonable steps on his part.195 Third, the recoverable damage may be reduced under the rule of
contributory negligence. The Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 Section 1(1)
provides that the fault of the person suffering damage will lead to the reduction of damages
recoverable. The court will consider the extent of the plaintiff’s share in the responsibility for
damages to make the just and equitable decision.196

C. Limitation of Action
Both contract claim and tort claim are subject to their own rule of limitation period. It
appears in most concurrent cases that the plaintiff prefer tort claim to contract claim because of
the longer limitation period. It is thus important to explore the different rules of limitation period
that are applicable to either tort claim or contract claim in order to find the answer to the question
as to whether the courts allow the plaintiff to rely on tort claim because of the longer limitation
period.
When the plaintiff fails to bring lawsuit within the period of time required, his claim will
generally be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed. The court enforces the limitation
period that is agreed by the parties although it is shorter than the period that specified by the
applicable statute of limitations if such period is reasonable.197 However, the agreed period that
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is longer than the limitation period legislatively fixed is held void because this is contrary to
public policy.198
1. Statute of Limitations under U.S. Law
In general, the breach of contract cause of action is likely to have a different limitation
period in comparison to the tort claim.199 Characterizing cause of action between contract and
tort will affect the determination of the limitation period. There are different either federal and
state statutes of limitations which have limited different periods of time both in contract and tort
cause of actions. In Hutchinson v. Smith, 417 So. 2d 926 (Miss. 1982), the court recognized that
where the plaintiff has more than one legal remedy (remedy both in contract and tort), he may
choose to seek the remedy that is more beneficial as to the view of the applicable limitation
period.200 So plaintiff’s pleading and the form of action may dictate the applicable limitation
period.201 As it appeared in the legal malpractice actions, some courts have applied the tort
statute of limitations to the legal malpractice action when the plaintiff’s complaint sounds in tort
although the claim could be brought in contract.202
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Normally, the significant issue of limitation period for the court to be determined is the
issue of the starting date of the limitation period. This is because the statutes frequently state that
the period begins to run when the plaintiff’s cause of action accrues. To determine at what point
of accrual to begin with is interpreted by the court, in particular, in the case where the
wrongdoing and the resulting injury are not simultaneous.203 In doing so, the court will consider
the different rules amongst “(1) the occurrence of the legal violation ( the occurrence rule), (2)
the resulting damage (the damage rule), and (3) the awareness of the resulting harm and its
causation (the discovery rule).”204 Especially, if the discovery rule is applied to the action, the
shorter limitation period may not be barred. Conversely, the longer period may be time barred
because of the earlier date of the commencement that is applied by the occurrence rule.
1.1 The Statute of Limitations for a Breach of Contract Claim
Many jurisdictions have the written-contract limitations statutes that usually run four to
six years except for a few states that provide the much longer period.205 For instance, the
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-725 provides that the written contract for sale of goods runs for
four years after the cause of action accrues. So when the seller is in breach of express or implied
warranty under contract for sale of goods, the UCC § 2-725 is the applicable limitation period in
particular to the economic loss arising from the defective product.206 Some courts reason that
UCC 2-725 is properly applied to the breach of implied warranty because such breach is created
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by Article 2 of Uniform Commercial Code.207 On the contrary, other courts focus on the strict
tort liability of the personal injury defective product litigation and select to apply the personal
injury or tort statute of limitations.208 The personal injury or tort statute of limitations is also
apply in an action brought against the constructor when the personal injury arising from the
breach of construction contract even though there are separate statutes of repose for
improvements to real estate.209
Unwritten or implied-contract limitations statute usually provides the shorter period than
that is provided for the written contracts.210
Some courts interpret that the cause of action for breach of contract accrues on the date of
the breach.211 Taking breach of warranty case as another example, if the plaintiff brings the suit
claiming breach of warranty, the accrual commences when the seller tenders delivery of goods
although the seller does not know the breach.212 Additionally, the parties to a contract may agree

207

See CORMAN, Id. at 310; see also David J. Marchitelli, Annotation, Causes of Action
Governed by Limitations Period in UCC § 2-725, 49 A.L.R.5th 1, § 40(a) (1997).
208

See CORMAN, Id. at 311; see also Marchitelli, Id. §§ 40(b)(c); Parish v. B. F. Goodrich Co.,
235 N.W.2d 570 (Mich. 1975); Martin v. Julius Dierck Equip. Co., 374 N.E.2d 97 (N.Y.1978);
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
209

See CORMAN, Id. at 312; see also Berns Constr. Co. v. Miller, 491 N.E.2d 565 (Ind. Ct. App.
1986).
210

See CORMAN, Id. at 287-98, 303.

211

See CORMAN, Id. at 375-76; see also Burke v. Hamilton Beach Div., Scovill Mfg. Co., 424
A.2d 145 (Me. 1981); Bullen v. Roto Finishing Sys., 435 So. 2d 1256 (Ala. 1983).
212

See CORMAN, Id. at 496; see also Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville Sales
Corp., 626 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Hockessin Tractor, Inc., 420 A.2d 154 (Del.
1980); Stumler v. Ferry-Morse Seed Co., 644 F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1981); see also U.C.C. § 2-725
(AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002).
43

upon a shortened contractual limitations period to replace a statute of limitations, as long as it is
reasonable.213
1.2 The Statute of Limitations for Tort Claim
The time limitations for tort claim vary from state to state.214 In negligence cause of
action, the plaintiff is often required to commence the claim within two or three years from the
date the cause of action accrues.215
Regarding cause of action in tort, the beginning of the limitation period depends on the
occurrence of the harm.216 Some courts recognized the damage rule that requires the actual
damages as the essential element of a negligence cause of action.217 In other words, all elements
necessary to the cause of action, such as tort of legal malpractice claim,218 must occur in order to
maintain the claim.219 So the tort cause of action traditionally accrues when damages occur.220
In addition, the concept of continuing wrong may postpone the time of accrual of the cause of
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action in tort while this concept does not apply to action for breach of contract.221 These can
explain why the time limited for tortious action may expire later than that of the contractual
claim. However, when the plaintiff’s claim involves intentional tort, the limitation period begins
to run at the date of wrong act because the damage is not the essential elements of actions.222
Remarkably, the discovery rule also be adopted to determine the beginning point of the
limitation period in case of the claim for the latent injury223 and the action in tort of medical
malpractice224 as well as legal malpractice.225
The characterization of claim has affected the plaintiff’s right to relief in respect of time
limitations specially in concurrent claim. The court at times held that the action sounds in tort by
looking at the gravamen of the action even though the plaintiff makes an attempt to allege breach
of contract in order to get the benefit of the longer limitation period.226 However, the court also
considered the nature of the contractual obligation to apply the contract statute of limitations to
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the action claiming for damage caused by defendant’s negligent failure to perform duties arising
out of a contract.227
2. Statute of Limitations under English Law
The question as to whether the plaintiff’s cause of action is barred by limitation period is
govern by the Limitation Act 1980. The action is barred if the plaintiff does not commence his
claim for the right to remedies within the fixed period of time.228 In such situation the plaintiff
has the burden of proving that his claim is asserted within the limitation period.229
2.1 The Statute of Limitations for a Breach of Contract Claim
It is imposed that “An action founded on simple contract shall not be brought after the
expiration of six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued.”230 A contract made
by deed is referred to a “specialty” under the Limitation Act 1980 Section 8(1) and the twelve
years of limitation period is applied.231 These general limitation periods are subject to numerous
exceptions such as the extension of limitation period in case of disability232 or the postponement
of limitation period in case of concealment of the facts relevant to the plaintiff’s right of
action.233 However, it is generally accepted that the parties are allowed to set their own
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limitation periods and the starting point of period of time as a term of contract.234 The contractual
term of limitation period is valid but the term is subject to the general law on validity
particularly, under the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 and the Consumer Rights Act 2015.235
Generally, the date of the commencement for breach of contract action is the date of the breach
of the contract even if no loss has been suffered at that date.236
2.2 The Statute of Limitations for Tort Claim
It is provided that “An action founded on tort shall not be brought after the expiration of
six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued”237 While the cause of action
accrues at the date of defendant’s wrongful act in the case of tort actionable per se, in the case of
negligence which is actionable only on the proof of damage, the cause of action accrues at the
time the damage actually occurs.238
In addition, the period of three years is the special time limit for actions in respect of
personal injuries. The rule states that this three-year period is applicable to
“any action for damages for negligence, nuisance or breach of duty (whether the
duty exists by virtue of a contract or of provision made by or under a statute or
independently of any contract or any such provision) where the damages claimed
by the plaintiff for the negligence, nuisance or breach of duty consist of or include
damages in respect of personal injuries to the plaintiff or any other person.”239
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The period of three years begins to run from “(a) the date on which the cause of action
accrued; or (b) the date of knowledge (if later) of the person injured.”240
In case of negligence cause of action for recover any form of latent damage, the action
shall not be brought after either six years from the date which cause of action accrues or three
years from the date on which the plaintiff had the knowledge of certain facts required for
bringing an action for damages if this period expires later.241 Importantly, the latent damage
provisions contained in Section 14A of the Limitation Act 1980 only apply to tort claims.
Furthermore, there is the time limit for negligence actions not involving personal injuries
whether or not the plaintiff is aware of damages.242 Limitation Act 1980 Section 14B provides
that:
“an action for damages for negligence, other than one to which section 11 of the
Limitation Act 1980 applies, shall not be brought after the expiration of fifteen
years from the date (or, if more than one, from the last of the dates) on which
there occurred any act or omission--(a) which is alleged to constitute negligence;
and (b) to which the damage in respect of which damages are claimed is alleged
to be attributable (in whole or in part).”243
In general, regarding the date of commencement, the accrual of negligence cause of
action accrues at the date on which the negligent conduct has caused damage whereas the cause
of action for breach of contract accrues when the contract is broken. Due to the difference of the
date of accrual of contract and tort action, the plaintiff may have a longer limitation period in tort
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than in contract.244 It is true even if in the case of bailment claim. To illustrate, where there is a
breach of bailment contract, if the plaintiff sues in wrongful conversion as for a tort, the six years
runs from the date of demand and refusal but if the plaintiff sues in contract, the six years runs
forthwith from the breach of contract.245
In conclusion, with comparison to the statute of limitation under breach of contract claim,
in some certain types of tort claim, the plaintiff has a longer limitation period for commencing
his claim. This may be because the statutory limitation is longer. Or it may be because the
occurrence of the cause of action in tort occurs later than that of contractual action. Or it may be
because of the application of the limitation period for latent damages.246 As can be seen, in most
concurrent cases the plaintiffs choose to rely on the tort claim when the contractual claim is
barred by statutes of limitation.
D. The Effect of Exculpatory Clause
In some situations, it is unacceptable to allow the plaintiffs suing in tort when the contract
action is not available in particular where there appears either the express or implied term of a
contract between plaintiff and defendant to exclude contractual liability or there is an express
disclaimer by the defendant. In such situations, the issues of interpretation and statutory validity
arise both for contractual terms and disclaimers. If the exculpatory clause or disclaimer is valid,
this will raise the policy question as to whether we should let the plaintiff makes a claim in tort
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when it is apparent that he chooses to assert tort claim to avoid an exculpatory clause or a
disclaimer that he agreed to in a contract. It might be that courts will not assist a plaintiff who
was not vulnerable or dependent, but whose relationship and bargaining position with the
defendant gave the opportunity for negotiation of a contractual term to cover the issue, but the
plaintiff did not take it. It is noteworthy that the preliminary question arises whether the
exculpatory clause of the disclaimer is valid. To answer such question, it is thus necessary to
consider the U.S. and English law with regard to the validity of exculpatory clause for both
contractual claims and tort ones.
1. The Validity of Exculpatory Clause under U.S. Law
1.1 The Exclusion of Contractual Liability
In general, parties are free to make the agreements as they wish, and the court will
enforce them without passing on their substance.247 However, the court may decide that the
interest in party autonomy is outweighed by some other interest, especially public policy, and
will refuse to enforce the agreement or some terms of it.248 When the court refuses to enforce an
agreement on grounds of public policy, the court may hold that part of the agreement is
enforceable though another part of it is not.249

The contract terms may be governed by the concept of unconscionability that is one of
the public policy concerns. Uniform Commercial Code Article 2 (UCC 2-302) deals with
unconscionable contracts and terms of the contracts. This rule of unconscionability has wisely
247
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applied, either by analogy or as an expression of a general doctrine, to many other kinds of
contracts, including contracts that fall under other articles of the Code.250 The Restatement
Second of Contracts contains a section on unconscionability patterned after the Code’s and
applicable to contracts generally. This general rule provides that:
“If a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is made a
court may refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the remainder of the
contract without the unconscionable term, or may so limit the application of any
unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable result.”251
The parties sometimes agree to incorporate the provisions to exclude or limit their
contractual liability that amounts to tortious liability.252 It is submitted that a party cannot
exempt itself from liability in tort for harm that it causes intentionally or recklessly. 253
However, a party generally can exempt itself from liability or limit its liability in tort for harm
cause by negligence, so long as the provision is not unconscionable.254 In exceptional cases,
however, courts have held such an agreement unenforceable because the agreement affects the
public interest and the other party is a member of the protected class. For example, first, an
employer cannot exempt itself from liability in negligence to it employee. 255 Second, a common
carrier or a public utility cannot exempt itself from liability in negligence to one it has
250
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contracted to serve in that capacity, although it may be allowed to limit its liability to a
reasonable agreed value in return for a lower rate.256 Therefore, when the court found that the
contract contains an exculpatory clause that is unenforceable on grounds of public policy, the
court inclines to refuse to enforce such term. 257 As a result, the court will generally enforce the
rest of the agreement.

1.2 The Exclusion of Tortious Liability
The parties to the contract can agree to bear the risk of injury although such risk is caused
by the other’s negligent conduct.258 However, any forms of the exemptions of tort liability such
as disclaimer of responsibility, a release or exculpatory agreement may be unenforceable because
of the laws of contract enforceability,259 public policy,260 or other state laws.261 Some states
consider a release to be void if such release attempts to waive liability for grossly negligent,
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reckless, or intentional conduct.262 In addition, the exculpatory clause that attempts to exclude
liability for negligence must be explicitly stated in contract.263

2. The Validity of Exculpatory Clause under English Law
2.1 The Exclusion of Contractual Liability
It is important to consider the validity of the exculpatory clause since this kind of
exclusion of contractual liability has greatly affected the imposition of tortious duty of care under
English law. As for the enforceability of the exemption clauses, if such clauses are included in
contract between the parties who one of them is not consumer- that is the business to business
contracts, this contract is governed by the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977.264 This act is
generally being applied to the business liability in the case of both contract and tort, except for
contract for the sale of goods or hire-purchase.265 This act imposes the rule to restrict the parties’
right to exclude or limit their liabilities if such liabilities is subject to the act. For example, the
party cannot agree to exclude or limit liability for death or personal injury arising out of breach
of any contractual obligation to take reasonable care, or breach of any duty of care in tort.266
Another restriction is that the party cannot exclude or limit liability for damages other than death
or personal injury, unless the contract term satisfies the reasonableness requirement.267 In
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addition, when one of the contracting parties deals on the other’s written standard terms of
business, the other party cannot by reference to contract term exclude or limit his liability in
relation to his breach of contract, unless such contract term satisfies the requirement of
reasonableness.268 According to a requirement of reasonableness, the question arises as to
whether the term is “a fair and reasonable one to be included having regard to the circumstances
which were, or ought reasonably to have been, known to or in the contemplation of the parties
when the contract was made.”269 The party who claims the exemption clause has the duty of
proving the reasonableness of that contract term.270
Turning to consider the enforceability of exemption term included in consumer contracts,
the rules of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 are applied in invalidating the exemption clauses.
For instance, a trader cannot exclude or limit liability for death or personal injury that arises from
breach of an express or implied contractual obligation to use reasonable care in a consumer
contract, or from breach of a duty of care in tort.271 The other exclusion of liability is also
governed by the Consumer Rights Act 2015 Section 62 that generally governs any unfair term of
a consumer contract. The unfair term is not binding on the consumer if it causes a significant
imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations under the contract to the detriment of the
consumer.272 However, Section 62 does not affect the operation of: 1) exclusion of liability:

268

Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, c. 50, § 3(1), (2) (Eng.).

269

Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, c. 50, § 11(1) (Eng.).

270

Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, c. 50, § 11(5) (Eng.).

271

Consumer Rights Act 2015, c. 15, § 65 (Eng.).

272

Consumer Rights Act 2015, c. 15, § 62 (Eng.).
54

goods contracts; 273 2) exclusion of liability: digital content contracts274 and 3) exclusion of
liability: services contracts.275
It has been considered that imposing tortious duty of care owed by the contracting party
will be inconsistent with the contractual terms if the exculpatory clause is valid under either the
Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 or the Consumer Rights Act 2015 as the case may be. In this
case the court will not allow the concurrent tort claim in such situation.
2.2 The Exclusion of Tortious Liability
In general, under the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria, the express or implied agreement
between the plaintiff and defendant to release the defendant’s responsibility is enforceable if they
have agreed before the act of negligence occurs.276 Nevertheless, the agreement that resolves the
defendant from legal responsibility of his negligent conduct is treated as the exculpatory clause
that falls within the restriction of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 Section 2. This act
imposes the rule to restrict the parties’ right to exclude or limit their liabilities if such liabilities
are subject to this act such as liability for death or personal injury arising out of breach of any
duty of care in tort or liability for damages other than death or personal injury that does not
satisfy the reasonableness requirement.277 In addition, there is the prohibition on exclusions
from liability under the Consumer Protection Act 1987 Section 7278 which provides that the
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liability to a person who has suffered damage caused wholly or partly by a defect in a product
shall not be limited or excluded by any means including contract term, notice or provision.

E. Summary
Indeed, most rules and principles of either contract law or tort law of U.S. and English
systems are quite similar. However, U.S. laws may vary from state to state while English
jurisdiction will apply the same laws to any disputes occur in such jurisdiction. Apart from
English common law, English legislative branch also develops some laws in relation to both
contract and tort in the form of statutory laws such as Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act
1999, Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, Limitation Act 1980, Law Reform (Contributory
Negligence) Act 1945, and Consumer Protection Act 1987 etc. These legislative laws have
influenced on the occurrence of concurrent issues and affected the recognition of the concurrent
tort claims in English Jurisdiction. Although U.S. legislatures do not enact so much statutory
laws in the fields of contract and tort law, the issue of concurrent claims has been prevailing
throughout the U.S jurisdictions. Also, the recognition of concurrent tort claims has been
affected by U.S. common law of contract and tort law. The plausible reasons why the plaintiffs
have a preference for tort claim over contract claim or vice versa would be the differences
between contract and tort law in each legal system which could affect the more advantageous
rights granted to them. As to forgoing explanation, all reasons could be (1) broader scope of
remedies; (2) more favorable limitations period; (3) getting around a lack of privity; (4) getting
around an exculpatory clause.
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III. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CONCURRENT CLAIM
This Chapter will illustrate the development of contract law and tort law in relation to the
concurrent situation as in general in common law legal system throughout the period of time.
In English jurisdictions, at the beginning of the second half of the 20th century until the
recognition of concurrent liability in Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd. [1995] 2 AC 145
(HL) 185, it seems that courts adopted something very like the French’s approach (The noncumul principle) in particular cases concerned with liability for solicitors’ negligence, holding
that a claim against a solicitor for negligence must be pursued in contract, and not in tort.279
The case arising in the borderland of tort and contract began with a claim of negligence
against the person who engaged in a trade or common calling such as the case of a ferryman who
negligently overloaded his boat and drowned the plaintiff's horse; the case of a surgeon who
negligently operated on his patient; the case of carpenter who built unskillfully and a barber who
injured the plaintiff’s face.280 Those foregoing cases were sued in the form of trespass on the
case that is a kind of tort claims.281 After that the action on the case for negligent conduct was
expanded to the bailment cases by applying the notion of an assumpsit of the defendant’s
undertaking to serve the plaintiff.282 The reason why the actions were brought in the form of tort
was because all proceeding actions was originally in the form of tort actions.283 Later, the action
of assumsit has separated from the action on the case and has become a contract action. By
279
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considering the development of both tort and contract cause of actions, there is the view that it is
still possible to maintain the tort action on the case in any contract situation.284 Ultimately, it
was clear that the notion of assumsit would lie for any breach of contract. However, in certain
situations there might still maintain a remedy in tort action.285
When Tort and Contract became the separate area, it is necessary for the court to
determine the limits of the tort action. In other words, the English court has to determine
whether there must be an election of the remedy or whether the cause of action pleaded in the
case at bar was the one in contract or the other in tort.286 So it appeared that at one time the
actions against the carrier287 and the bailee288 were treated as the pure contract.
Finally, English courts have recognized the choice of the substantive rights of plaintiff by
considering the substance of the action pleaded in order to make a classification.289 Interestingly,
it was said that the U.S. courts have followed the earlier English decisions, but courts also have
their own confusion.290 The primary and significant question the courts have to find the answer
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is that when does the breach of contract also meet the required elements of torts? There is also
the view that contract itself is the important factor and source of tort obligation.291
Considering English decision, there exists an opinion provided that “Wherever there is a
contract and something to be done in the course of the employment which is the subject of that
contract, if there is a breach of duty in the course of that employment, the plaintiff may recover
either in tort or in contract.”292 More importantly, concurrent liability between breach of contract
and tort was clearly recognized in Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd [1995] 2 AC 145, (HL)
which will be thoroughly discussed in Chapter five.293 In Henderson, Lord Goff discussed the
two possible approaches about the effect of the contractual relationship in excluding duty of care
in tort: the first view that is taken in France is that the contract excludes a remedy in tort: the
second approach that is taken in Germany is that contractual and tort claims may be concurrent.
After having analyzed the authorities, Lord Goff accepted the view that the existence of
contractual contract does not exclude the concurrent duty in tort. Lord Goff said that:
“But, for present purposes more important, in the instant case liability can, and in
my opinion should, be founded squarely on the principle established in Hedley
Byrne itself, from which it follows that an assumption of responsibility coupled
with the concomitant reliance may give rise to a tortious duty of care irrespective
of whether there is a contractual relationship between the parties, and in
consequence, unless his contract precludes him from doing so, the plaintiff, who
has available to him concurrent remedies in contract and tort, may choose that
remedy which appears to him to be the most advantageous.”294
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However, the party must keep in mind that he cannot have double recovery by judgment
satisfied for more than one monetary remedy based on both causes of action.295 It is clear that
though the court has accepted the principle of concurrence, this does not deny the parties’
freedom to include a term in their contract excluding another cause of action provided that such
term is enforceable under the governing rule.296
Turning to consider U.S. jurisdiction, there are many cases holding that a carrier is still
liable in negligence tort as well as in breach of contract for all damages to the passenger and to
the passenger’s properties.297 In such tortious liability of carrier case, the contract is considered
only as an incidental. Similarly, the bailee, innkeeper and physician are also held liable in tort
for damages arising out of the breach of duty imposed in the parties’ relationship.298 There is the
view that the U.S. courts tend to be more liberal in imposing the tortious duty to the case of
misfeasance in breach of contract.299 Until the early 17th century, the assumsit as the primary
form for contract and Case as a form for tort were overlapped and the action raised by
contracting parties could be pleaded in Case and vice versa.300
It is clearly stated once in the decision of Indiana court301 that the duty of care is implied
from the contractual relationship, and a breach of contractual contract can establish a failure to
exercise the duty of care that creates tort liability. When such situation occurs, Indiana court
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allowed plaintiff to choose to sue in tort or in contract. In Flint & Walling Mfg. Co. v. Beckett,
79 NE. 503, 505 (Ind. 1906), the court referred to Professor Pollock’ s view that in some cases,
the tortious liability may coexist with a liability for breach of contract arising from the same facts
towards the same person. The duty of reasonable care is not released merely because of the fact
that the parties are under a contract, and may be liable for breach of contract.302
However, maybe because of the different protected interests and the origin of legal duties
as well as obligations, there appear the conventional views that the areas of tort and contract are
entirely distinct and the breach of contract is not in itself a tort.303 However, it is argued that a
rule of law lies behind both tort and contract so that the fields of contract and tort is
overlapping.304 Moreover, tort duties can at times be created by contractual promises.305
In the twentieth century, courts have expanded the boundaries of tort by imposing the
doctrine of “bad faith breach” in insurance contracts.306 Until 1984 there are some suggestions
that the court should extend this cause of action beyond the insurance cases.307 However, most
jurisdictions refuse to apply tortious liability in usual employment relationship between
employer and employee where the employee was discharged by the employer under at-will
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employment.308 In addition, California court finally refused tort remedy for noninsurance
contract breach in the absence of violation of an independent duty arising from principle of tort
law.309
In addition, an economic perspective regarding the imposition of tort damages when the
party is in the efficient breach is raised in order to criticize the appropriate approach of allowing
tort claim.
As to economic perspective, it is argued that even though the imposition of tort damage
will invade the principle of sufficient breach, the economic analysis still supports imposing tort
damage in the breach of contract. It is supposed that tort damage will be an appropriate and
necessary remedy independent of the remedies presented by contract theory if it is imposed to
prevents an opportunistic breach of contract.310 California courts allow tort claim by having
relied on the special relationship between the party as the justifiable rationale.311 However,
courts did not discuss, in detail, the factors that are necessary to support that a claim of breach of
the implied covenant should sound in tort.312 Moreover, because there has been the idea that the
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contracting party should not be penalized for the efficient breach,313 it is suggested that the
nature of the breach should be analyzed and defined to justify tort remedies to prevent the
deterrence of sufficient breach of contract.314
In summary, studying through the historical development shows that the plaintiffs have
originally relied on the form of tort actions in all disputes between the parties. However, when
both U.S. and English contract laws have been developed separately from tort law, it is likely
that the contracting parties’ rights have lied in the law of contract to protect parties’ expectations.
Nevertheless, until the 20 the century both U.S. courts and courts of England have been
confronted with the pragmatic problems of concurrent claim between contract and tort. Notably,
there exists the recognition of concurrent tortious liability, especially tort of negligence, in
certain situations in many kinds of contracts. The concurrent tort claim has been recognized for
many reasons raised by courts but it has been restricted for some reasons as well. Interestingly, it
is suggested that in recognizing the concurrent tort claim, the court should consider the concept
of efficient breach that is developed in U.S. contract law.
IV. CONCURRENT LIABILITY UNDER U.S. LAW
Negligence cause of action under U.S. law has developed from the action on the Case.315
Notably, the action on the Case involved the parties whose duties depend upon their relationship
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by contract or status.316 The relationship under the contract may require each party to act in the
way that can avoid harm to the other party.317 It has been generally acceptable that the tort
liabilities based on fault of defendant are the general basis of liabilities in all cases, in particular,
liabilities for other damages other than pure economic loss.318 However, it also has been
accepted that in general, not doing the required act at all or “nonfeasance” does not create the
tortious liability. There is nevertheless the tortious liability for “misfeasance.” If the defendant
undertakes to perform his duty and then he does not completely perform his duty, this is the kind
of “misfeasance” that might be actionable in tort and make the defendant liable for it.319 In
addition, standard of care owned by each party was implicitly imposed by their relationship. 320
Further, there is also an extension of tort liability for nonfeasance. Whenever there is the
contractual relationship between the party giving an affirmative duty to act, it has become
recognized that there might be tortious liability for nonfeasance.321
In the cases where courts recognized concurrent tortious liability either by considering
the nature of claim or by adhering to the form of action, the court will provide the justifiable
reasons in many respects to support their judgments as we can see in the cases explained in this
chapter.
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A. An Elective Right to Concurrent Tortious Liability
U.S. court clearly recognized the freedom of election between contract claim and tort
claim in Comunale v. Trader & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654 (1958) by stating that “…it is the
rule that where a case sounds both in contract and tort the plaintiff will ordinarily have freedom
of election between an action of tort and one of contract…”322 This can be perceived that the tort
liability can be raised even though there exists the contractual relationship. Taking the cases of
non-compliance with bailment contract as the examples, where the bailment terms require the
bailee to return the undamaged goods, courts held that the plaintiff has the choice to sue in either
breach of contract or in tort negligence.323 This means that the contracting party is not
compelled to rely only on breach of contract action even though there exist the contractual rights
and duties between the parties.324 In bailment cases, the tort of conversion or negligence is
allowed in accordance with the plaintiff’s choice.325 Moreover, it is conceded in one New York
court that tort liability may arise out of or be coincident with contract under the same set of facts
and between the same parties.326 However, in some situations the plaintiff may be compelled to
sue only in contract claim. These situations could be the cases that plaintiff will seek for the
recovery of economic loss.
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B. The Recognition of Concurrent Tortious Liability for Economic Loss
The economic loss rule is invoked in considering whether the plaintiff can sue in tort
action claiming for the suffered damages that are not the physical harms to plaintiff or plaintiff’s
property. Under economic loss rule, some courts refuse tort claim and insist that plaintiff should
rely on contract claim where the plaintiff and defendant have contracted with respect to the
matter claimed.327 This is because courts view that the contracting parties have allocated the
economic risk by making an agreement.328 If the tort liability for economic risks is allowed, tort
law will undermine the parties’ contractual allocation of responsibilities for economic loss.329
When the tort claim is excluded by economic loss rule, the plaintiff has to rely on contractual
claim even though such claim may be barred by disclaimers, limitation period or damages
limitations.330 Therefore, when pure economic tort rule is invoked in cases where one party
claiming that the other negligently perform a contract between them, contract will replace the
tort duty of reasonable care and plaintiff can only seek for relief in contract action331 except for
certain circumstances such as in the case of professional negligence such as a legal malpractice
claim.332 So in some legal malpractice actions the claims may be brought as a contract claim and
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a negligence claim and the court may deal with the question as to whether the lawyer violates his
tortious duty created by the contract.333 In such malpractice claims, the economic loss rule does
not apply to eliminate negligent liability if the special relationship between the parties is
proved.334 Notably, in proving the element of legal malpractice action, the plaintiff must prove
the lawyer’s duty being established and imposed from the client-lawyer relationship between
them.335 Therefore, in asserting professional negligence, the plaintiff must take the burden of
pleading and proving all essential elements of claim.
1. Pleading Both in Contract Claim and Tort Claim in One Suit Is Allowed in
Professional Negligence
Taking the decision of Kohn, Savett, Klein & Graf, P.C. v. Cohen, Civil Action No. 892173, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4150 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 10, 1990) as an example, the court recognized
that the plaintiff in a legal malpractice action has a choice in concurrent claim and stated that in
Pennsylvania, an action for legal malpractice may be brought in either contract or tort.336 In
Kohn, the court held that when this malpractice counterclaim is premised upon the plaintiff’s
negligent conduct of the case, it sounds in tort. The court also reasoned that although all legal
representation virtually occurs within the scope of a contract between lawyer and client, this does
not mean that the contractual limitations period automatically applies. The court would rather
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look to the terms of the contract allegedly breached and to the nature of the injury asserted.337 In
addition, it is noticeable in this case that the court allowed the different counts of counterclaim
claiming both in contract and tort.
When plaintiff is allowed to assert both contract claim and tort claim in one suit, the court
must consider the gravamen of complaint to determine the plaintiff’s right. In such case, the gist
of allegations is significantly considered by the court in finding whether the plaintiff’ s legal
malpractice claim sounds in tort or contract. In N.Y. Cent. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Edelstein, 637 F.
App’x 70 (3d Cir. 2016), the court held that appellants’ Second Amended Complaint in legal
malpractice action sounds in tort and agreed with the District Court that appellants’ tort claim is
untimely. The court reasoned that when the court considered the gravamen of appellants’
allegations, it appeared that appellants do not identify a specific contractual obligation in any
provisions that appellees failed to perform or point to an explicit agreement or instruction that
appellees breached. The court also concluded that this is a case in which the contract between
appellants and appellees is best “regarded merely as the vehicle, or mechanism, which
established the relationship between the parties, during which the tort of negligence was
committed.”338 By considering the gist of allegations, it is likely that courts allow tort claim in
addition to contract action.
2. An Adequacy of Asserting Claims Is Required in Legal Malpractice Action
Plaintiff is required to prove both the essential elements of a breach of a professional duty
and the actual loss arising from a breach.
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Looking at the requirement of the adequacy of asserting claim in legal malpractice case,
in Stacey v. City of Hermitage, No. 2:02-cv-1911, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29359 (W.D. Pa. Apr.
7, 2008), the court ruled about the ways plaintiff states a valid claim for legal malpractice against
defendants under either contract or tort theory. The court applied pleading standard set forth in
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007), for evaluating motions to dismiss
plaintiff’ complaint that asserted claims of legal malpractice, contract, and conspiracy. The
standard is that a complaint may not be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff cannot prove set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. This
means that a complaint must allege enough facts to show that a claim is plausible and not merely
conceivable. By applying such standard, the court held that the amended complaint not only
fails to set forth sufficient facts to establish the elements of a legal malpractice claim but also did
not state the basic essentials of an enforceable agreement under assumpsit theory such as offer,
acceptance and consideration. Such holding of this court emphasized that in asserting cause of
action in concurrent claim, plaintiff is required to explain enough facts proving that defendant’
conducts meet all elements of legal malpractice or breach of contract. In particular, for asserting
claim of legal malpractice, one of the essential elements is proof of actual loss rather than a
breach of a professional duty causing only nominal damages, speculative harm or the threat of
future harm. Importantly, a plaintiff must prove “a case within a case” by showing that he had a
viable claim in an underlying case and that the attorney was negligent in prosecuting that
action.339
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3. Concurrent Tort Claim Is Not Excluded under the Independent Duty Doctrine.
As being discussed above, the right to pure economic loss is generally allowed in a
breach of contract claim while such loss is harshly restricted in tort action. It is noteworthy that
even if some courts have the same purpose of excluding tort claim because of the economic loss
rule, courts choose not to refer to such rules by name and decide the case by considering the gist
of the action340 instead. This lead to the development of independent duty doctrine in the case
where the court allowed plaintiff seeking for pure economic loss in tort action rather than action
in contract. It may be stated that the exceptions to the economic loss rules are usually provided
and illustrated, for example, in the case where the defendant is under the duty of tort that is
independent of the contract and the contract does not reflect an intent to make the contractual
remedy exclusive.341
In Eastwood v. Horse Harbor Found., Inc., 170 Wash. 2d 380 (2010), the Supreme Court
of Washington disagreed with the Court of Appeals’ interpretation and application of the
economic loss rule in limiting the plaintiff’ right to contractual remedies. The court argued that
an injury is recoverable in tort if such injury traces back to the breach of duty that arises
independently from the contractual terms. The court described that Washington law342 imposes
upon every tenant the duty to not cause waste which is a tort duty arising independently out of a
lease contract. The duty to not cause waste is considered as independent tort because an early
340
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American authority described such duty as an obligation the tenant owes even if the lease
covenants say nothing about the issue.343 Thus, the court held that the injured lessor can ask for
damages concurrently under both in tort and breach of contract. Additionally, in deciding the
issue of this case, the court opted the term “independent duty doctrine” instead of the term
“economic loss rule” because the permissible tort remedy depends on the existence of
independent tort duty344, not on whether the injury can be described as an economic loss.
Significantly, although the statutory law imposed the tort law duty to not cause waste,
such duty is usually supplemented by a lease covenant allocating responsibility for repairs
between the parties. When the lease provisions are violated by one party and the other party
suffers from damages, the question usually arises as to whether the economic loss is limited to be
remediable under the law of contracts or whether it is also the tort of “waste” within the meaning
of provision of statute.345 Recently, the answer to foregoing question is already provided in the
decision in Eastwood case that plaintiff can simultaneously commit a breach of lease and a
breach of a tort duty that arises independently of the lease’s terms.346

343

Eastwood v. Horse Harbor Found., Inc., 170 Wash. 2d 380, 398 (2010).

Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc., 102 P.3d 268 (holding that Fraud was separate from party’s
breach of contract and breach of warranty. Therefore, plaintiff has the right to the recovery in tort
for purely economic loss. The court further explained that business parties can be expected to
allocate their risks to which they have contemplated however no business party expects that the
other party will defraud it.).
344

345

WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 64.12.020 (LexisNexis 2017).

346

Eastwood, 170 Wash. 2d at 386-87.
71

C. The Recognition of Concurrent Tortious Liability in a Bad Faith Breach of
Contract
In U.S. Jurisdiction, courts are attempting to allow tort damages for bad faith breach of
contract. This also illustrate one kind of development in a rigid doctrinal division between tort
and contract.347 The justifiable rationale is that every contract contains an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.348 When the contracting party violates the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, he can thus be held liable in tort. This kind of concurrent tort cause of action
being invoked in Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654 (1958). In Comunale, the
court opined that there is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every contract
including policies of insurance that neither party will do anything which will injure the right of
the other to receive the benefits of the agreement. The court in Comunale v. Trader & Gen. Ins.
Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654 (1958) created a bad faith breach of insurance contract to impose a tortious
liability on insurers who refused to settle the claim asserted by third party.349 The implied
obligations are imposed based upon the principles of fair dealing which enter into every contract
even if such duties are not expressly stated in written contract. The court has also emphasized
and relied on the test of the existence of the special relationship between insurer and insured
when the court held that a tort action is available for breach of the covenant in an insurance
contract. This special relationship is characterized by the elements of public interest, adhesion,
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and fiduciary responsibility.350 Accordingly, the court ruled that where a case sounds both in
contract and tort, the plaintiff will ordinarily have freedom of election between an action of tort
and one of contract.351 Interestingly, this case also mentioned an exception to the freedom of
election rule. The exception to elective right is made in some suits for personal injury caused by
negligence, where the court considered that the tort character of the action prevails. However,
such exception is not applied in this case which related to financial damage. Notably, the court
refused applying the doctrine of bad faith breach beyond the insurance contract. 352 Nevertheless,
there are some of the U.S. decisions353 holding that the bad faith withdrawal or termination from
the pre-contractual phase of negotiations may result in extra-contractual liability based on the
doctrine of promissory estoppel.354 The court reasoned that the preliminary negotiations
generate a social relationship that imposes on the parties the duty to act in good faith, which not
only governs legal relationships already established, but also those derived from a simple social
contract. Notably, these cases illustrate that under the doctrine of promissory estoppel, U.S.
courts also impose the duty of good faith beyond the insurance contract especially in precontractual phase of loan agreement.355
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D. The Recognition of Concurrent Tortious Liability to a Third-party Beneficiary
Some courts permit non-contracting party who suffers from contracting party’s breach of
contract to bring lawsuit against breaching party claiming in tort.
There is another California case that the court allowed the third party as the beneficiary
of the will to seek for damages in tort by considering the special relationship between the
attorney and the intended beneficiary. In, Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal. 2d 223 (1969), the court
concluded that an attorney who negligently fails to fulfill a client’s testamentary directions incurs
liability in tort for violating a duty of care owed directly to the intended beneficiaries. The duty
of care in this case is imposed by considering the contexts of the relationship between the
attorney and the intended beneficiary. In this case, the court also referred to the public policy
that requires the attorney to exercise his duty to not cause harms to persons whose rights and
interests are certain and foreseeable. Ultimately, the court concluded that the complaint stated a
sufficient cause of action in tort under the doctrine of Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583 (1961). In
Lucas, the court stated that the harmed party not only could recover as an intended third-party
beneficiary of the attorney-client agreement providing for legal services but also recover on a
theory of tort liability for a breach of duty owed directly to him. The court also cited Biakanja v.
Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647 (1958) where the defendant argued that the absence of privity deprives a
plaintiff of a remedy for negligence committed in the performance of a contract. The court
rejected the defendant’s contention and then analyzed that the determination whether the
defendant will be held liable to a third person not in privity is a matter of policy and involves the
balancing of various factors including356 (1) the extent to which the transaction was intended to
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affect the plaintiff; (2) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff; (3) the degree of certainty that
the plaintiff suffered injury; (4) the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct
and the injury suffered; (5) the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct and (6) the
policy of preventing future harm. Therefore, the new rule is imposed under California law as to
the concurrent situation that the doctrine of privity of contract is not required for a third person
who suffers from damages arising from negligent performance of contractual duty.357
E. The Recognition of Concurrent Tortious Liability due to the Public Policy
Concern
There is the view that tort law has intruded into the contract in order to protect public and
private interests other than the expectations of the parties.358 Also, courts find nothing
inconsistent in holding that a certain set of facts give rise to a tort action for one purpose, and to
an action in contract for another purpose.359 In so doing, the court’ decision is motivated by the
public policy behind the rule that is in question before the court in finding the borderline between
contractual claim and tort claim.360
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Taking New York Courts as the example cases that recognized concurrent liability due to
the public policy concern, New York court drew the rule regarding the existence of duty of care
arising out of the subcontract in Lord Elec. Co. v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 226 N.Y. 427
(1919). In Lord Elec. Co., the city of New York entered into a contract with plaintiff for surface
construction work on a bridge. After that, plaintiff entered into a contract with defendant to
furnish all labor and materials for the asphalt work. It appeared that during the progress of the
work, defendant caused a fire which damaged the bridge structure. As a result, plaintiff was held
liable under principal contract. Consequently, this case is brought by plaintiff. The ruling of this
case imposed the duty of care to the party in performing all duties arising from sub-contractor
contract. This court reasoned that the plaintiff agreed with the city to take ample precaution to
protect the entire structure against injury by fire. And according to the subcontract, the
defendant was also bound to take ample precautions to protect the entire structure against injury
by fire caused by it. The court further reasoned that the plaintiff’s liability under principal
contract should not be extended to cover the entire work. Likewise, the defendant’s liability
should not be limited to its own work when defendant accepted all the conditions of the principal
contract. Therefore, it is fair and reasonable to interpret and impose duty of care to the defendant
under the subcontract. Considering the rule on concurrent liability, the court held that plaintiff’s
allegations and proof were sufficiently broad to enable it to establish a cause of action based on
negligence. The court indicated that negligence, considered merely as a tort, is a wrong
independent of contract, but negligence may also be a breach of contract if the contract itself
calls for care. From the decision in Lord Elec. Co., it is the rule that the plaintiff is allowed to
concurrently assert the cause of action of negligence when the contract itself calls for care. In
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particular, the court required a fair and reasonable construction of contract between the party in
imposing the duty of care on the defendant.
Moreover, other decisions also demonstrate that where the facts in any action appear that
the elements of both tort and breach of contract are presented, New York courts may provide the
different answers for the questions whether the action is viewed as in tort or in contract. The
following situations illustrate that apart from providing the plaintiff’s elective right between
action in contract and tort,361 New York courts also determined the essential nature of the action
and held that action sounds in tort rather than in contract, for the purpose of solving the issue
before the court.362
In terms of statute of limitations issue, it is necessary to determine the fundamental nature
of the action in order to consider whether it is barred or not. Some cases were held that the tort
statute of limitations applied because the courts felt that the gravamen of the claim caused by
negligence even though the form of the action was the contract. In Webber v. Herkimer & M. S.
R. Co., 109 N.Y. 311 (1888), Court of Appeals of New York held that the carrier is liable to the
plaintiff in damages if plaintiff as the passenger suffered from personal injury without his fault.
The court reasoned that common carriers of passengers are not insurers of personal safety so
when there exists an injury, happening to the person of a passenger, the carriers are only liable
for negligence in failing to use due care, diligence or skill in and about their undertaking.
However, the action is statutory barred because plaintiff did not submit the claim within the
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limitation of three years. Significantly, in deciding cases under the statute of limitations, courts
found cause of action in tort regardless of the plaintiff’s form of the action.363
In Loehr v. E. Side Omnibus Corp., 18 N.Y.S.2d 529 (App. Div. 1940), the question as to
whether a cause of action is barred by the three-year Statute of Limitations is raised. The Court
of New York adopted the rule laid down in Webber case. The court still held that the cause of
action sounds as tort rather than contract even though the facts is apparent that plaintiff’s
allegation clearly indicated the violation of the term of the contract.
It seems that, for the purpose of statute of limitations issue, courts indicate that
negligence conduct gives rise to a tort action despite the fact that the duty was established by
contract.364 Stated another way, if the gravamen of case is found in tort, the plaintiff cannot
circumvent the statute of limitations by asserting in contract action. It is also recognized that, if
the gravamen sounds in tort, it is justified in asserting tort action which is more favorable for
plaintiff.365
F. Summary
U.S. law has recognized the elective right of concurrent tort claim, in particular, in cases
where the plaintiff brings the suits for the recovery of physical harms to a person or property.
However, U.S. law restricts the tort claim in cases where plaintiff is seeking for pure economic
loss not resulting from physical harm or physical contact to a person or property. Concurrent tort
claim for the recovery of economic loss is permitted only in certain circumstances such as in the
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case of professional negligence, claim for bad faith breach of insurance contract. Significantly,
U.S. courts are attempting to develop and apply the independent duty doctrine rather than
economic loss rule to allow more tort of negligence claims for economic loss. Importantly, in all
concurrent cases, the underlying rationales being raised by courts to support concurrent tort
claim mostly relate to either the public policy concerns such as solving the issue of limitation
period, establishing fairness and reasonableness between the parties or a gap-filling mechanism
in contract law such as fulfilling the gap of an absence of privity.
V. CONCURRENT LIABILITY UNDER ENGLISH LAW
Under English law, the concurrent liability between contract and tort is mainly raised and
criticized in claims of negligence. The court will be in the dilemma situation to consider whether
the tortious duty of care should be imposed on the defendant who is voluntarily bound by the
contractual duty. The number of the situations creating an overlap between breach of contract
and negligence tort has been risen over the period of time.366 In particular, the question as to
whether the contracting party can sue in tort arises when the tort negligence has been expanded
and allowed the plaintiff to recover pure economic loss in some situations.367 Under English
law, it seems unacceptable for imposing the duty of care which is inconsistent with what the
parties have agreed especially when the duty of standard of care is more burdensome than the
express or implied contractual duty.368 Therefore, it is likely to be the principle rule that so long
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as the tort negligence is consistent with the terms of contract, there is no objection to the plaintiff
choosing to sue either for breach of contract or for the tort of negligence if one of them is
considered to be more favorable to the plaintiff.369 It has appeared that the plaintiff’s right to
choose to rely on tort of negligence is traditionally accepted in the case where the defendant
exercises his duty in the course of the ordinary occupations such as carriers, innkeeper or
bailee.370 Specifically in medical treatment case, the answer to the question arising as to whether
there is the concurrent liability in tort is always in the affirmative.371 Recently, it is apparent that
a solicitor who performs his duty for the reward owes the duty both in contract and tort.372
There are the controversial views as to the bailment contract such as hire of goods. When
the bailee misuse or damages the goods, Winfield viewed that the bailee is not in tort but is liable
in breach of contract because the bailee’s duty arises from the relationship the parties have
agreed.373 However, this view is argued that the bailor should have the right to claim ether
breach of specific provision in contract or breach of the bailee’s common law duty that amounts
to tortious liability.374 This is because there are tortious duties that can only exist when there has
been the prior contract between the parties.

369

See BURROWS, Id. at 6.

370

See BURROWS, Id. at 6.

371

See CLERK & DUGDALE, supra note 61, ¶ 10-07; see also Edwards v. Mallan [1908] 1 KB
1002 (CA) (appeal taken from Eng.).
372

See CLERK & DUGDALE, Id. ¶ 10-101.

373

See WINFIELD, supra note 62, at 10.

374

See WINFIELD, Id. at 10.
80

A. An Elective Right to Concurrent Tortious Liability
It is possible that both contractual liability and tortious liability co-exist on the same set
of facts and the alternative claim for damages is available.375 In such situation the court allows
the tort claim provided that concurrent claim is not expressly or implicitly exclude by contract.376
In the case where the plaintiff is the contracting party, it is acceptable that where there is the
contractual relationship between the parties and the defendant is in breach of contract, the
plaintiff may choose to sue in tort instead in order to circumvent the limitations in contract law
or to be able to make a claim going beyond what was agreed in the contract.377 In another
situation where the plaintiff is not the party to the contract but the plaintiff suffers from damages
because of defendant’s breach of contract, the court allows the action in tort because the doctrine
of privity precludes a contractual claim. Although most cases have accepted the concurrent tort
claim when the issue is raised, it is still controversy in specific situations. And this may be the
case of claiming for economic loss in tort action.378
B. The Recognition of Concurrent Tortious Liability for Economic Loss under the
Assumption of Responsibility Doctrine
As being stated in chapter two, if plaintiff suffers only economic loss arising from
defendant’s negligent conduct, generally, he will not be allowed to recover such damages under
tort claim. However, since there is the decision of Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller & Partners
Ltd. [1964] AC 465 (HL), lawyers and other professionals could be held in being liable for
375
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negligence independently of contract. It can be said that the duty of care will arise if the
professions undertake any task to provide service for the other that relies on the profession’s
competence and skill. Under the concept of assumption of responsibility, it also appeared in the
case of medical service that the medical practitioner who either provides the treatment
gratuitously or performs for the reward is liable for negligent treatment of the patient.379 English
law also implicitly imposed duty of care that is bound by the supplies. Under the Supply of
Goods and Services Act 1982 Section 13, there exists the implied duty of the suppliers who
perform their task in the course of a business that the suppliers will carry out the service with
reasonable care and skill. Hence, when the suppliers negligently breach of duty of reasonable
care, this will establish a breach of contract380 and negligence tort as well.
It is recognized that the assumption of responsibility doctrine plays an essential role in
liability for pure economic loss.381 To illustrate the recognition of concurrent tort liability under
the Assumption of Responsibility Doctrine, the following cases will be considered.
To begin with, In Hedley Byrne, it appeared that the bankers negligently provided the
recipient (a firm of advertising agents) favorable reference for one of their customers. Moreover,
when giving the reference in relation to the credit-worthiness of their customers, bankers knew
or ought to have known that the plaintiffs would rely on their special skill and judgment in
furnishing the reference. And the plaintiffs in fact relied upon the reference provided and then
placed the advertising order on behalf of the company (the bank’s customer) that later turned out
379
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not being respectably constituted company and being into liquidation. As a consequence, the
plaintiffs suffered financial loss. Accordingly, the question arose whether bankers could be held
liable in tort in respect of the gratuitous provision. In Hedley Byrne, the facts appeared that the
relationship between two parties is not contractual because it is gratuitous (no consideration).
But, in principle, the court permitted liability in the absence of consideration by standing in the
way of an appropriate allocation of risk on the merits and regarding the consideration as a
technicality.382 The reasons why the House of Lords allowed the liability in the absence of
consideration is expressed in two factors. First, courts have often expressed ambiguous, even
critical, sentiments about consideration as a requirement for contractual validity.383 The court
gave the reason that without consideration the promise is unenforceable as a contract but if it
appears that the service is in fact performed negligently, the tort action should be actionable for
recovery damages.384 Second, courts focused on the economic reality of the relevant relationship
and explained that by giving the reference for the customer, the bank received the benefit in
some respects as to its business.385
Indeed, we can find that English court began with providing the plaintiffs right to tort
claim because the contract is unenforceable because of the absence of consideration. Stated
simply, in Hedley Byrne, plaintiffs could ask the courts to recognize negligence action for
recovery of financial loss regardless of persistence of consideration when the court found that
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defendants assumed the responsibility towards the plaintiffs in such circumstances. In other
words, the duty of care towards the recipients of information was owned by the bankers. To
provide the principle in this case more precisely, we should consider Lord Morris of Borth-yGest’s opinion which stated that:
“My Lords, I consider that it follows and that it should now be regarded as settled
that if someone possessed of a special skill undertakes, quite irrespective of
contract, to apply that skill for the assistance of another person who relies upon
such skill, a duty of care will arise. The fact that the service is to be given by
means of or by the instrumentality of words can make no difference. Furthermore,
if in a sphere in which a person is so placed that others could reasonably rely upon
his judgment or his skill or upon his ability to make careful inquiry, a person takes
it upon himself to give information or advice to, or allows his information or
advice to be passed on to, another person who, as he knows or should know, will
place reliance upon it, then a duty of care will arise.”386

However, in this case a duty of care was finally negated since there was an express
disclaimer of responsibility.
More particularly, the tort liability is clearly allowed in the case of Solicitor’s liability. In
Midland Bank Trust Co. Ltd. v. Hett, Stubbs and Kemp [1979] Ch 384, the court allows the
plaintiff to sue in tort for negligently omitting to register the option as an estate contracts by
reason of the existence of the relationship between solicitor and client that is the relation of a
client consulting a solicitor for advice. 387 This kind of relation in Midland Bank Trust Co. Ltd.
gave rise to a duty of care under the Hedley Byrne principle.
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Furthermore, in Midland Bank Trust Co. Ltd., Lord Oliver J. gave his opinion that by
looking at the speech of Lord Devlin in the Hedley Byrne, he believed that Lord Devlin treats the
existence of a contractual relationship as very good evidence of the general tortious duty. 388
Therefore, he gave reasons and held that the relationship of solicitor and client gave rise to a duty
in the solicitors under the general law to exercise their duty of care and skill upon which they
must have known well that their client relied.389 After that, the decision in Midland Bank Trust
Co. Ltd. was admitted by the House of Lords in Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd 1995 2 AC
145 (HL) holding that defendants owed the duty of care to plaintiffs so that plaintiffs could seek
for pure financial loss in tort action even though limitation period in contract claim was barred
but it was not in tort claim.
In Henderson, the consistent concurrent liability for breach of contract and negligence
tort is fully accepted in another type of professional relationship. That is the relationship
between Lloyd’s Names and their underwriting agents who carry out their underwriting functions
towards the Names for whom they acted under the underwriting agency agreement. In
Henderson, even though there is the contractual relationship between the plaintiffs (Lloyd’s
Names) and defendants (Managing Agents), plaintiffs (both direct Names and indirect Names)
chose to allege a concurrent duty of care in tort. This is because plaintiff wish to be able to get
the benefit of the longer limitation period in this case where the date for the accrual of the cause
of action in tort occurred later than that in contract. In this case, with respect to the liability of
managing agents to Names (both direct and indirect Names) in tort, the court held that plaintiffs
could sue in tort to recover damages for pure economic losses. The court further explain that the
388
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existence of contractual relationship is not the objection.390 Moreover, Lord Goff’s opinion
indicated that the parties can expressly agree to restrict or exclude the tortious liability, provided
that such agreement is subject to the ordinary principle of validity.391
Looking at the opinion in Henderson’s case in detail, we can see that the tortious duty of
care is imposed under the concept of assumption of responsibility and tort liability is allowed for
the reason of preferable limitation period. Lord Goff reasoned that in the cases of claim against
the professional parties such as solicitors or architects, it is possible that the contractual claim is
barred by limitation period at the time of breach when the plaintiff is unaware of the existence of
breach. So the concurrent liability in tort is necessary to protect the plaintiff when the
consequences of party’s negligent breach may occur after the lapse of limitation period for
contract claim.392 Lord Goff also referred to the statements and the application of the assumption
of responsibility principle that was stated by Lords in Hedley Byrne. For instance, Lord Devlin
in Hedley Byrne opined about the doctrine of assumption of responsibility by saying that:
“categories of special relationships which may give rise to a duty to take care in
word as well as in deed are not limited to contractual relationships or to
relationships of fiduciary duty, but also include relationships which…are
‘equivalent to contract’ that is, where there is an assumption of responsibility in
circumstances in which, but for the absence of consideration, there would be a
contract.”393
After considering the statements of doctrine, Lord Goff stated that:
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“we can derive some understanding of the breadth of the principle underlying the
case. We can see that it rests upon a relationship between the parties, which may
be general or special to the particular transaction, and which may or may not be
contractual in nature. All of their Lordships spoke in terms of one party having
assumed or undertaken a responsibility towards the other. On this point, Lord
Devlin spoke in particularly clear terms… Further, Lord Morris spoke of that
party being possessed of a special skill which he undertakes to apply for the
assistance of another who relies upon such skill.”394
Furthermore, Lord Goff suggested that “…once the case is identified as falling within the
Hedley Byrne principle, there should be no need to embark upon any further enquiry whether it
is ‘fair, just and reasonable’ to impose liability for economic loss…”395
Finally, Lord Goff concluded that the principle of assumption of responsibility has been
expressly applied to a number of different categories of person who perform services of a
professional or quasi-professional nature, such as bankers, solicitors, surveyors, valuers,
accountants and insurance brokers.396 If the plaintiff relies on the advice or the statement
provided by the defendant who has the special skill, the defendant owns the duty of care to the
other party and may be held to take responsibility for his negligent conduct. It does not matter
whether the defendant carries on the business of giving the kind of advice that is sough or not.397
Apart from the reasons provided in such three cases mentioned above, it is further explained that
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the special relationship is established when the defendant assume responsibility to perform the
task rather than the assumption of legal liability to the plaintiff for its careful performance.398

1. The Tortious Duty of Care Is Denied by the Effect of Exculpatory Provision.
Even if there is the acceptance of the concurrent liability, the parties are free to include a
term in their contract excluding another cause of action.399 Especially, although there is the
special relationship between the parties in the case of undertaking the task of providing a
statement or services, the duty of care imposed on the ground of assumption of responsibility is
denied where it appears that the defendant disclaims his liability in respect of a statement or
services.400 The disclaimer may be treated as the relevant fact to consider whether the
assumption of responsibility should be invoked.401 Therefore, it is undisputable rule that in
principle concurrent tortious liability is recognized. However, it is unacceptable to allow the
plaintiff suing in tort when the contract action is not available because of the existence of an
express disclaimer by the defendant or the exculpatory terms that are inconsistent with tortious
duty of care.402 Keeping in mind that, both a disclaimer and exculpatory terms are governed by
the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, the issues of statutory validity and interpretation of
398
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contractual terms or those of disclaimers may thus arise in concurrent action. Accordingly, only
enforceable disclaimer can have an effect on the exclusion of duty of care.403
Taking Robinson v. PE Jones (Contractors) Ltd., [2011] EWCA Civ 9; [2012] QB 44
(CA) as an example, in this case the plaintiff who purchased a house, which was under
construction, from the defendant who was the builder, sued for damages for the expenses in
rebuilding as the pure economic loss. The facts appeared that the contract incorporated the
National House-Building Council’s (NHBC) standard form of agreement which limited the
builder’s liability for defects to the first two years. The plaintiff also brought the claim against
the defendant in tort of negligence to get the advantage of limitation period. The preliminary
issue was whether the defendant owed the plaintiff a concurrent duty of care in tort in respect of
pure economic loss. Finally, the plaintiff’s right to recover pure economic loss was refused by
the reason that the duty of care in tort was inconsistence with the contractual term stating that
“the defendant’s liability to the plaintiff would be limited to that set out in the NHBC agreement
and had thereby expressly agreed to exclude any liability which might otherwise arise…”404 And
the court held that such terms were reasonable under the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. The
reason is stated in Lord Jackson LJ’s opinion that “It is not possible for the plaintiff to invoke the
law of tort in order to impose liabilities upon the defendant which are inconsistent with the
contract.”405
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We can see that English law permits parties to the contract to include the exculpatory
clause in order to exclude or restrict tortious liability for financial loss as long as such clause is
reasonable under the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. This indicates that the parties’ right to
allocation of risk under contract is still recognized and protected by the court.
2. The Tortious Duty of Care Is Denied in Relation to Defective Things Giving Rise
to Pure Economic Loss
Meaningfully, in Robinson v. PE Jones (Contractors) Ltd., we can see that the court also
considered the characteristic of relationship between the parties which is normally considered as
the key factor in giving the answer to the question as to whether one party assumes the
responsibility that gives rise to the tortious duty of care regarding the economic loss. In giving
the answer to this question, in Robinson v. PE Jones (Contractors) Ltd., Lord Jackson LJ
reasoned that the parties had not been in a professional relationship whereby the plaintiff paid the
defendant for advice, reports or plans on which he would rely, but they had entered into a normal
contract for the purpose of completing the construction of a house and buying it.406 Therefore,
although there is no limitation of liability clause incorporated in contract, the defendant as the
builder did not owed the tortious duty of care in relation to any defect in the building giving rise
to pure economic loss. It was further explained that tort law limited more duty of care upon the
manufacturer or builder than that on the other professionals. Clearly stated, the manufacturer or
builder owes the duty to take reasonable care to protect only suffering personal injury or damage
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to other property.407 In Robinson v. PE Jones (Contractors) Ltd., Lord Jackson LJ considered
Lord Goff’s opinion in Henderson’s case and concluded that the essential points of Henderson’s
case are:
“(i) When A assumes responsibility to B in the Hedley Byrne sense, A comes
under a tortious duty to B, which may extend to protecting B against economic
loss. (ii) The existence of a contract between A and B does not prevent such a
duty from arising. (iii) In contracts of professional retainer, there is commonly an
assumption of responsibility which generates a duty of care to protect the client
against economic loss.”408

However, the opinion in Robinson v. PE Jones (Contractors) Ltd. has been criticized that
it is difficult to explain precisely what it is about giving professional advice or reports that
justifies Lord Jackson LJ’s opinion.409
Interestingly, apart from Lord Jackson LJ’s opinion, Lord Stanley Burnton LJ provided
another strong opinion that:
“it must now be regarded as settled law that the builder/vendor of a building does
not by reason of his contract to construct or to complete the building assume any
liability in the tort of negligence in relation to defects in the building giving rise to
purely economic loss.” 410
Lord Stanley Burnton LJ further explained that the distinction between the case where the
party owes the tortious duty of care and case where the party does not, is the difference of two
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parties between a party who supplies defective things which causes damage to person or other
properties and a person who supplies defective or valueless things themselves.411 Taking an
architect for example, the architect will owe a duty of care in relation to the building that is
defective when being constructed with architect’s drawing of specification supplied by him. But
the other party cannot sue an architect in tort of negligence action simply because his plans are
worthless. From this view, we can see another indication as to the existence of concurrent
tortious duty particularly in building contract. That is, to consider whether something that is
supplied by one party causes the injury to person or other things. If the answer is in the
affirmative, the party who supplies the thing under contract also owes the duty in tort to the other
party.
3. The Tortious Duty of Care Is Denied by the Effect of Scope of Duties Imposed by
the Contract.
There is another interesting decision that restrict the imposition of tortious duty of care on
the contracting party. From this viewpoint, the duty of care in tort can concurrently arise
between the parties to the contract if such duty will not be more extensive than the duties
imposed by the contract.412 Put this in another way, the duty in tort will not extend further than
the contractual duty to the client.413
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In Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd. v. Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd. [1986] AC 80 (PC), the issue
is whether the company as the bank’s customer owed the duty of care in tort to his bank to
examine his bank statements so as to be able to detect forgeries. Lord Scarman delivered the
judgment of their Lordship of the judicial Committee of the Privy Council in relation to the
nature and extent of the duty of care owed by a customer to his bank in the operation of a current
account. Considering Lord Scarman’s statement thoroughly, he raised the question that
“Whether English law recognizes today any duty of care owed by the customer to his bank in the
operation of a current account…414 As to the question stated by Lord Scarman, their Lordships
of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council answered the question that the customer’s duty in
English law in relation to forged checks is limited in twofold: first, a duty to refrain from
drawing a check in the manner that may facilitate fraud or forgery, and second, a duty to inform
the bank of any forgery of a check purportedly drawn on the account as soon as he becomes
aware of it.415 From their Lordships’ view, it is stated that if the bank wants to put a wider duty
of care to the customer to take the reasonable care in operating a current account, the bank and
his customer can agree a clear contractual terms binding obligation upon the customer to query
his bank statement.416 Their lordships further stated that it cannot believe that there is anything
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to be beneficial for imposing a liability in tort where the parties are in a contractual relationship
in particular to a commercial relationship.417
It is well to keep in mind that although there was the opinion of Tai Hing Cotton Mill
Ltd., as discussed before, there was also the appearance of some cases418 that clearly recognized
the concurrent tortious duty of care by adopting the Hedley Byrne doctrine of assumption of
responsibility. In addition, there is the view that support the application of the assumption of
responsibility doctrine as a mechanism in fulfilling the gap in contract law such as the restriction
of the concept of consideration and privity of contract under English contract law.419
C. The Recognition of Concurrent Tortious Liability to a Third-party Beneficiary
Concurrent tortious liability is also applied as the gap-filling mechanism when the court
confronted with the problem under the principle of privity of contract. In White v Jones 1995 2
AC 207 (HL), the tort claim was available where the plaintiff was not the party who has entered
into the contract with the defendant. In this case, the court held that the duty of care was owed
by the solicitor to the plaintiffs who will be the intended beneficiaries under particular will.
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Also, the concept of the assumption of responsibility is invoked in White’s case in order
to fill the gap whereby the third person who suffered the loss cannot sue in contract because of
the doctrine of privity.420 To fill the gap of contract law in White’s case, Lord Goff stated that
“… the nature of the transaction was such that, if the solicitors were negligent and
their negligence did not come to light until after the death of the testator, there
would be no remedy for the ensuing loss unless the intended beneficiary could
claim. In my opinion, therefore, your Lordships’ House should in cases such as
these extend to the intended beneficiary a remedy under the Hedley Byrne
principle by holding that the assumption of responsibility by the solicitor towards
his client should be held in law to extend to the intended beneficiary who (as the
solicitor can reasonably foresee) may, as a result of the solicitor’s negligence, be
deprived of his intended legacy in circumstances in which neither the testator nor
his estate will have a remedy against the solicitor.”421
The important reason provided by Lord Goff that should be emphasized is that for the
reason of privity problem, a tortious duty of care will be recognized only in limited circumstance
where the court found that plaintiff could not have the opportunity to protect his economic wellbeing by using contractual mechanism. We can observe that when the plaintiff is not in a
position to protect himself upon contractual claim, courts are willing to solve privity problem by
recognizing a duty of care in tort between defendant and non-contracting party provided that the
contract is intended to benefit non-contracting party.422
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D. The Scope of Recoverable Damages in Concurrent Tortious Liability May Be
Limited to the Rule of Contract.
It appeared that there exist the cases where the court recognized the existence of the
concurrent liability in both contract and tort but the court limited the plaintiff’s right to take
advantage of the more generous rules for remoteness of damage available in tort.
In Banque Bruxelles Lambert SA v. Eagle Star Insurance Co. Ltd. [1997] AC 191 (HL)
that comprised of three cases, defendants as valuers, were required by the plaintiffs to value
properties on the security of which they were considering advancing money on mortgage. Later,
it appeared that defendants considerably overvalued the property causing the loss to the plaintiffs
who made the loans. And, in each case, the plaintiffs brought actions against the defendants
claiming that defendants were in negligence and breach of contract. The court held that the
cause of action meets the requirement both in contract and tort. As it is stated in Lord
Hoffmann’s opinion that:
“Because the valuer will appreciate that his valuation, though not the only
consideration which would influence the lender, is likely to be a very important
one, the law implies into the contract a term that the valuer will exercise
reasonable care and skill. The relationship between the parties also gives rise to a
concurrent duty in tort: see Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd. [1995] 2 A.C.
145. But the scope of the duty in tort is the same as in contract.
“A duty of care such as the valuer owes does not however exist in the abstract.
A plaintiff who sues for breach of a duty imposed by the law (whether in contract
or tort or under statute) must do more than prove that the defendant has failed to
comply. He must show that the duty was owed to him and that it was a duty in
respect of the kind of loss which he has suffered.”423
“…the scope of the duty, in the sense of the consequences for which the valuer is
responsible, is that which the law regards as best giving effect to the express
obligations assumed by the valuer: neither cutting them down so that the lender
423

Banque Bruxelles Lambert SA v. Eagle Star Insurance Co. Ltd. [1997] AC 191 (HL) 211
(appeal taken from Eng.).
96

obtains less than he was reasonably entitled to expect, nor extending them so as to
impose on the valuer a liability greater than he could reasonably have thought he
was undertaking.”424

It is noticeable that this concurrent case begins to apply the same limitation of the scope
of duty in respect of the kind of loss suffered in tort as that applied in contract.
Taking Wellesley Partners LLP v. Withers LLP [2015] EWCA Civ 1146; [2016] Ch 529
(CA) as another example, the court held that the defendant firm of solicitors had been
professionally negligent for misdrafting a limited liability partnership agreement and the court,
however, applied the contractual test for recoverability of damage for economic loss. The court
further explained and concluded in Lord Floyd LJ’s opinion that:
“contractual and tortious duties to take care in carrying out instructions exist side
by side, the test for recoverability of damage for economic loss should be the
same, and should be the contractual one. The basis for the formulation of the
remoteness test adopted in contract is that the parties have the opportunity to draw
special circumstances to each other’s attention at the time of formation of the
contract. Whether or not one calls it an implied term of the contract, there exists
the opportunity for consensus between the parties, as to the type of damage (both
in terms of its likelihood and type) for which it will be able to hold the other
responsible. The parties are assumed to be contracting on the basis that liability
will be confined to damage of the kind which is in their reasonable contemplation.
It makes no sense at all for the existence of the concurrent duty in tort to upset
this consensus, particularly given that the tortious duty arises out of the same
assumption of responsibility as exists under the contract.”425
The argument for the application of the remoteness test and for the court’s conclusion is
supported by the scholar’s view in his footnote 57 of McGregor on Damages.426 It is submitted
that the victim of the case of concurrent professional negligence should not be allowed to rely on
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the wider tortious test of reasonable foreseeability and ignore the stricter contractual test of
contemplation of the parties, in particular, when the pure economic loss is allowed in tort of
negligence427 This is because the victim is the party to the contract, not a stranger and the parties
should be bound by the risk they have allocated under their contractual relationship.
It is worth noticing that this case raised the significant viewpoint as to the difference in
the tests for remoteness of damage between the two causes of action. Obviously, it has long
been conceded that according to Lord Goff’s statement in Henderson’s case, one of the practical
issues or problems of concurrent liability is the difference in the tests for remoteness of damage
between contract action and tort cause of action. Nevertheless, the test for remoteness of damage
in cases of concurrent liability was not an issue before their Lordships in Henderson, but the
issue was whether there was in fact a concurrent cause of action in tort at all. In Wellesley’s
case, the concurrent tort cause of action remains actionable but the scope of damages is limited.
So it is likely that after Wellesley’s case, the court might equate the scope of revocability of
pecuniary loss in tort and in contract by applying the contractual test of remoteness to concurrent
tort claim. More interestingly, it is suggested by one scholar that tortious liability and
contractual liability are parallel and essentially subject to the rules of their respective liability
regimes.428 It is also true even in this Wellesley’s decision. However, the reasonably foreseeable
losses of the tort are limited by the reasonably foreseeable losses under the contract regime in the
case where the tortious duty derived from the contractual duty.429 This application of remoteness
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rule does not mean that tort regime is trumped by contract regime.430 It is thus submitted that the
consequence of the application of two independent set of remoteness rule depends on the precise
fact situation in which concurrent liability in tort and contract has arisen.431
E. Summary
Similar to U.S. law, English law recognized the freedom of election between an action of
tort and one of contract particularly an action for the recovery of physical harms to a person or
property. However, English law strictly imposes the tortious duty of care where the plaintiff
askes for pure economic loss arising from the negligent acts or omissions of contracting party.
Consequently, English courts invoked the principle of assumption of responsibility to allow the
plaintiffs to be entitled to pursue concurrent tort claim for the recovery of pure economic loss.
The assumption of responsibility doctrine required proof of special or professional relationship
between the parties whereby one party paid the other party for advice, reports or plans on which
he would rely. Accordingly, courts strictly put the duty to the builders or manufacturers to take
the reasonable care in providing the defective things to the other party. In addition, the tortious
duty of care may be denied by the effect of the specific duty imposed by the contract. More
importantly, although there exists the professional relationship between the party, English courts
have the tendency to deny tortious duty if it is considered to be inconsistent with the contractual
terms especially any forms of enforceable exculpatory provisions. And it appears that English
courts are likely to protect the parties’ expectations by applying the more rigorous test of
remoteness of contract law to grant the recoverable damages in concurrent tort claim. All in all,
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in any cases of concurrent claims, we may conclude that English court considered issue of
limitation period, consideration and privity of contract as merely the technical aspects of contract
law preventing plaintiffs from suing for breach of contract. In considering such issues, it appears
to be that courts are willing to allow plaintiffs to sue in tort instead as long as the tort liability is
not excluded by the others relevant rules and principles.
VI. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CONCURRENT LIABILITY
In both U.S. and English laws, it is no doubt that where one contracting party’s conduct
causes harms to the other party, non-breaching party can rely on contact action in most cases.
Conversely, it has long been controversial regarding the right to elect to sue in tort instead of
asserting contract claim when there exists the contractual relationship between the parties. By
considering the differences between contractual and tortious liability in chapter two, we can see
some aspects of contract law that are more advantageous than those of tort law. Therefore, in
such situations the plaintiff definitely prefer action in contract to tort. And of course, there are
many justifications for suing in contract so long as such contract terms are enforceable.
However, there may be the gaps under contract law such as the absence of privity that bring
about the need to rely on tort law instead. In addition, the tort action may provide more
advantages in terms of the recovery of greater damages or of other technical issues such as the
issue of limitation period. One may think that for the sake of certainty and consistency it is more
plausible to allow the plaintiff to rely on just only contract claim in all situations. But we cannot
deny that in some situations, the contracting party also deserves to be protected under tort law at
the same time. Moreover, it appears that the parallel tort liability in contract is recognized in
both U.S. law and English law. The juridical decisions and academic views in both legal
systems also have the important influence on the recognition of concurrent liability between
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contract and tort. However, all views are based on the rules of contract and tort law in their legal
systems which are different in some respects. The development of contract law either in the
form of common law or statutory law has played the crucial role in developing concurrent tort
claim in both systems as well. As can be seen, the contracting party is certainly entitled to assert
tort claim as the elective right in both U.S. and English jurisdictions.
In U.S. jurisdiction, even though concurrent liability is recognized, it is obvious that the
breach of contract cannot also be a tort in every case. There are the restrictions especially in
cases where the plaintiff asks for the recovery of his economic loss. This is because U.S.
contract law has long been governed by the economic loss rule. In the cases where the
concurrent tort of negligence is brought for recover economic loss, U.S. law requires the
existence of special relationship between the parties to allow such claim. In other words, in the
case of professional negligence, U.S. court has permitted tort action for pure economic loss. For
such exception, the clear criteria for determine whether the defendant is one of the professionals
are required. In addition, it is generally excepted that attorney or counsel against whom the legal
malpractice claim is brought can be seen as the professional. Nevertheless, the plaintiff in legal
malpractice claim must plead his claim and prove the elements of legal malpractice action with
caution to make his claim meet all essential elements of professional negligence action. As such,
to consider the issue of concurrent tort claim for economic loss raised by the party in other kinds
of relationship, we may consider and apply the criteria discussed in some lawsuits claimed by
clients against attorneys. This is because legal malpractice claim can be seen as the common
example in some respects in relation to the concurrent tortious action for economic loss.
Additionally, U.S. courts develop the rule of independent duty and choose to apply such
rule rather than make a reference to pure economic loss rule. As a result, the concurrent tort
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claim for economic loss is actionable when the court believes that the gravamen of the complaint
gives rise to the duty of care which is independent of the contract. We can observe that by
adopting the independent duty doctrine, the court may extend the application of such rule to
impose concurrent tortious duty to the parties of the contract beyond the professional
relationship. This approach tends to be less strictly in recognizing the concurrent claim in U.S.
law.
Apart from the independent duty doctrine and the existence of special relationship in
professional malpractice claim, U.S. court establishes the concept of bad faith breach of contract
that amounts to tort liability especially insurer’s tortious liability in insurance contract. Yet, the
court has emphasized and relied on the test of the existence of the special relationship between
insurer and insured to hold that a tort action is available for breach of the covenant in an
insurance contract. So this kind of special relationship that is characterized by the elements of
public interest, adhesion, and fiduciary responsibility remains restrictive for the recognition of
this kind of tort liability in other relationships so long as other relationships have similar
characteristics with the insurance contract.
In effect, there is an attempt to restate the certain rules with regard to tort liability for
economic loss arising from contract (Economic Loss Rule) by the American Law Institute. The
main principles have been restated in the tentative drafts No. 1 (§§ 1-6)432 and tentative drafts
No. 2 (§§ 6-8).433 This work is aimed at looking on torts that involve economic loss, or
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pecuniary harm not resulting from physical harm or physical contact to a person or property.
Sections 1 through 5 of Chapter 1 of the tentative drafts No. 1 were approved by the membership
at the 2012 Annual Meeting of the Members of the American Law Institute.
In brief, according to this Restatement, Economic Loss is defined to cover the pecuniary
damage not arising from injury to the plaintiff’s person or from physical harm to the plaintiff’s
property.434 It is provided in Section 3 that:
“Except as provided elsewhere in this Restatement, there is no liability in tort for
economic loss caused by negligence in the performance or negotiation of a contract between the
parties.”435 This rule clearly states that when a party is negligent in performing a contract causes
economic loss to the counterparty, the injured party’s remedies are determined by other law:
principally the law of contract that has the specific purpose of allocating economic losses that
result from the performance of contracts.
This Restatement still recognizes the well-established exceptions to the economic loss
rule in the case of professional negligence. Such exception is addressed in § 4 of this
Restatement. That is the tort liability of professionals to their clients alongside the contract
between them. It is stated in § 4 that “A professional is subject to liability in tort for economic
loss caused by the negligent performance of an undertaking to serve a client.”436
So according to the Restatement, the action to recover for professional negligence or
malpractice action is still a prominent exception to the economic loss rule. It is reasoned that
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firstly, it is not always true in the relationship between a client and a professional that they
negotiated on equal footing to allocate their risks and secondly, the promises of professionals
tend to be limited to careful efforts rather than results.
Importantly, these Restatement rules will reduce the confusion that can result when a
party brings concurrent suit on the same facts under contract and tort theories asking for
economic loss that are largely redundant in practical effect. However, adopting these rules may
bring back the traditional approach that adheres to the strict economic loss rule. As a
consequence, the independent duty doctrine may be ignored and ultimately abandoned.
U.S. law also recognized the third party’s right to bring concurrent tort claim against the
contracting party who is in breach of contract in the absence of privity of contract. However, the
third party’s right to tort liability in concurrent case is granted only in limited circumstances.
The court has to balance all relevant factors to show both the relationship between the defendant
and a third-party beneficiary and the public policy concerns such as those of all stated in Heyer v.
Flaig case.
In tort of negligence case, it is inclined that the public policy concerns play important role
in imposition of tortious duty of care together with the contractual obligation. The court tends to
interpret the contract in the way that create fairness and reasonableness between the parties. We
can imply that without the requirement of fairness or reasonableness, the court may limit the duty
owned by party only to the contract regime unless there exist the certain circumstances falling in
the scope of other rules and doctrine that are stated above.
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Remarkably, when courts confronted with the issue of limitation period in concurrent
claim, for the policy of the statute of limitations,437 courts tend to consider the gravamen of
allegations rather than the form of action chosen by the plaintiff to determine whether the action
sounds in contract or in tort. Moreover, U.S. court applied the statute limitations of tort liability
when the court found that the action sounds in tort even though the plaintiff voluntarily elect the
form of contact claim. From my viewpoint, though U.S. law allows the plaintiff to plead the
facts on any cause of action which would fit them in the concurrent situation, U.S. courts have a
tendency to hold that the plaintiff's claim sounds in contract or in tort by considering the “gist” or
the “gravamen” of the action particularly when the court determines the issue of substantive law.
This situation could be the cases that the court confronts with either the question of the statute of
limitations or the issue of an appropriate measure of damages to be applied in granting the relief.
In comparison to English law, there has no apparent rules as to the restriction on
concurrent tortious liability in cases where the imposition of tortious duty will be inconsistent
with the terms of contract.438 However, U.S. court may rely on the freedom of contract doctrine
to enforce the terms of contract that reflect the parties’ intent to exclude their liability either
contractual liability or concurrent liability in tort provided that the contractual terms do not
violate any other laws or unconscionability doctrine. It is likely that the U.S. courts do not treat
the terms of the contract which limit the amount of damages or the requirement of notice of a
claim within a time limit as the one being inconsistent with tort. But it would be reasonable and
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fair if courts have allowed tort action and have held to apply such terms to tort action as well.439
This is because it reflects the parties’ intent to be bound by contract and protects the bargain the
parties have made. Contrary to English law, it does not clearly appear that the court limits scope
of remedies in tort by using the same test for recoverability of damage in contract claim.
After considering the rules of concurrent claim in U.S. jurisdiction, we can see that the
more the nature and limitations of the tort action arising out of a breach of contract are clearly
defined and illustrated, the more efficiently the plaintiff can deal with his complaint in order to
sustain his preferable cause of action.
Turning to English jurisdiction, English law gives elective right to the plaintiff in
asserting either contract action or tort claim. Similarly, plaintiff’s right to economic loss in tort
claim is highly criticized and recognized only in certain circumstances. English law allows
concurrent tort claim under the doctrine of assumptions of responsibility. Similar to U.S. law,
under the principle of assumption of responsibility, English court mainly focuses on the special
relationship between the parties in order to hold that the defendant is liable for economic loss in
concurrent claim of negligence.
Remarkably, even if the assumption of responsibility is established in Hedley Byrne’s
case where the plaintiff and the defendant are in the relationship that is equivalent to contract. It
appears that such doctrine is applied as a fortiori in order to support the duty of care in tort in the
case where there is the contractual relationship between the parties. So in order to bring suit in
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tort against the counterparty, plaintiff has to show enough facts in proving the existence of the
assumption of responsibility between them. And we can see that Henderson’s case is taken as
the leading authority on concurrent liability in professional negligence. Later, the doctrine of
assumption of responsibility is regarded as the conceptual basis for the recognition of all
professional persons’ concurrent tortious liability for economic loss to their clients such as
engineer’s duty440 and the medical practitioner. Notably, although the English courts did not
clearly refer to public policy concerns to allow the concurrent liability in tort, as can be seen in
some cases the court invoked the concept of assumption of responsibility for the purpose of the
limitation period issue at bar.
However, there exists the scepticism about the assumption of responsibility doctrine. It is
submitted by Lord Jackson LJ that the law on concurrent liability should be redefine. Lord
Jackson suggests that contracts should not generate duties of care in tort that is identical to the
contractual obligations.441 In effect, there exist the restrictions on the recognition of concurrent
tortious liability for economic loss under the assumption of responsibility doctrine in respect of
different underlying rationales that are described in chapter five.
Similar to U.S. law, English law also recognized concurrent tortious liability because of
the effect of the privity of contract doctrine. English jurisdiction now has its own legislative
contract law to protect rights of third party. The limited exceptions to the privity doctrine are

440

Pirelli General Cable Works Ltd. v. Oscar Faber & Partners [1983] 2 AC 1 (HL) (appeal
taken from Eng.).
441

Lord Justice Jackson, Concurrent Liability: Where Have Things Gone Wrong, 1, 1 (2014),
http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/tecbarpaper.pdf; see also Robinson v.
PE Jones (Contractors) Ltd., [2011] EWCA Civ 9; [2012] QB 44 (CA) 62 (appeal taken from
Eng.).
107

addressed in the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999. Under this act, a third party may
enforce a contractual term, only if (a) the term expressly so provides or (b) the term purports to
confer a benefit on him. When the rights of third party are clearly recognized in this act, this
may lead to the tendency for the court to strictly impose the tortious duty of care on the
contracting party to the third party. At least, the rights of third party in tort claim may be limited
only to the same conditions imposed in the act. Additionally, it is submitted that tort law should
not step in and should not impose duty on contracting parties to third person if the parties to the
contract do not confer rights on third parties, by using the mechanism of the Contracts (Rights of
Third Parties) Act 1999442
Looking, particularly, at the issue of exculpatory clauses, English court is likely to deny
tortious duty if the duty of care in tort is inconsistent with the terms of contract. As we have
perceived that in general, the freedom of contract doctrine allows the parties to freely agree to
exclude or limit liability for their breach of contract provided that such provisions do not violate
any statutory restrictions, such as the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 and the Consumer Rights
Act 2015. English courts have decided that it would be unreasonable if contracting parties are
permitted to evade the effect of exclusion or limitation clauses by suing in tort rather than in
contract. And whenever the court encounters the issue of validity of exculpatory terms, the court
can rely on applicable rules of either the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 or the Consumer
Rights Act 2015 that have the specific purpose to deal with the unfair contract term between the
parties as the case may be. So we can observe that when contract terms are enforceable under
this act, it would bring about a fair and reasonable legal effects to the parties if the court decide
to adhere to the agreement between them to protect their bargain of interest. This is the reason
442
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why English law does not impose concurrent tortious duty when duty in tort would be
inconsistent with such contractual provisions.
In addition, it is noteworthy that the liquidated damages are available only for breach of
contract. If the court allows the plaintiff to recover more quantum of damages in tort, plaintiff’s
right to recoverable damage in tort will be inconsistent with the principle of contract law and
contrast with the parties’ express intention. Therefore, the court may analogously treat the
enforceable term of liquidated damages as one of the restriction on the plaintiff’s right to rely on
tort claim as well.
Form my viewpoint, English courts have allowed the concurrent tort claim with caution.
Moreover, the judgments permitting concurrent liability have been considered as pragmatic
consideration. As we can see in chapter five, English courts are inclined to limit the concurrent
tort claim in some respects. First, English court denied concurrent tortious duty of care in
building contract in relation to defective things giving rise to pure economic loss. The court
gave the reasons by distinguishing the builder and manufacturer from the professional
relationship whereby one party paid the other party for advice, reports or plans on which he
would rely and establishing an indication to consider whether something that is supplied by one
party causes the injury to person or other things or not. Second, there is the decision that the
court attempted to strictly interpret the contractual duty and limited duty of care not to be more
extensive than the duties imposed by the contract.443 Third, the court recognized the existence of
the concurrent tortious liability on the condition that the plaintiff’s rights to the scope of damages
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in tort claim will be governed by the same contract rule of remoteness in the situation where
tortious duty derives from contractual relationship.444
In conclusion, it is apparent that law of contract and tort law under either U.S. law or
English law are not entirely separate but are linked in respect of the concurrent situation. We can
notice that the tort liability particularly tort of negligence under both U.S. law and English law is
not so extensive even if the concurrency is permitted. As we can see, even though each legal
system generally recognizes the concurrent tort claim particularly claim of negligence for
personal injury, this does not mean that the contracting party is entitled to rely on tort claim in all
situations. This is because there are also the restrictions upon the imposition of concurrent tort
liability especially in the cases where plaintiff brings lawsuit to recover pure economic loss. In
addition, it is likely that imposition of the concurrent tortious duty is more rigorously restricted
under English law than U.S. law in some respects.
VII. CONCLUSION
Most of the concurrent situations occur in the cases where 1) the plaintiff asks for the
recovery in tort claim despite the existence of contractual relationship or 2) the plaintiff asserts
contract claim but the defendant contends that the issue at bar especially the issue of limitation
period should be governed by tort law rather than contract law. In such situations, the court will
encounter the question as to whether the plaintiff’s allegation sounds in tort rather than in
contract or vice versa. By considering the differences between the contract law and tort law on
the right to remedies, it appears that neither action is exclusively more advantageous than the
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other. Therefore, the more valuable consequences of such rules have the influence on plaintiff’s
election of his claim when the concurrent situation occurs. Moreover, it was found that the
preferable type of damages recoverable (e.g., damages for emotional distress, punitive damages),
the more advantageous statute of limitation in tort law, the strict application of privity of contract
doctrine, and the restriction on exclusion of tort liability have influenced on the election of tort
claim.
Under common law system, it is the entirely the court’s discretion to recognize the
concurrent tort liability unless there is the explicit prohibition by the legislature. Both U.S. and
English generally recognize concurrent tort claim as an elective right. However, courts must
have the justified rationales either to allow the plaintiff’s tort claim or to apply tort rules
according to the defendant’s defense in order to protect parties’ expectation, create justice and
reinforce public policy.
Most of the cases in U.S. and English jurisdictions, courts held that the plaintiff’s
allegation sounds in tort rather than in contract by considering the “gist” or the “gravamen” of
allegations notwithstanding plaintiff’s choice of action. In particular, where the plaintiff asserts
the claim to recover physical injuries to person or to property in negligence cases, courts are very
likely to permit tort claim and apply tort rules to the issues disputed rather than contract rules.
Furthermore, the issue of limitation period and the privity doctrine are considered as merely the
technical aspects in the concurrent situation. U.S. and English courts is thus inclined to allow
plaintiff to rely on tort law if such rules of contract law preventing plaintiffs from suing for
breach of contract.
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There are also the restrictions on the permissive rule of concurrent claim particularly in
the cases where the plaintiff brings lawsuit claiming for the pure economic loss. After exploring
both relevant U.S. and English cases as well as academic writing, there appear the critical
limitations on the rights to tort claim as follows:
Firstly, it is generally accepted by both U.S. and English courts that the recovery for
economic loss is limited only in contract claim. However, U.S. law established the exceptions to
the economic loss rule in the cases of professional negligence and of bad faith breach of contract.
Nevertheless, the latter one is mainly limited only in the relationship in insurance contract.
Additionally, some courts are attempting to develop and apply the independent duty doctrine to
permit more tort claims of negligence especially for economic loss. Similarly, English law
invokes the principle of assumption of responsibility to impose tortious duty of care owed by the
defendant to the plaintiff. Under the assumption of responsibility, the special relationship
between the parties is mainly required in order to grant the award to the plaintiff who assert
concurrent claim of negligence for economic loss.
Secondly, it is clear that under English law, the tortious duty of care can be excluded or
limited by the exculpatory clause or contractual term of liquidated damages. There exists the
refusal of imposing the duty of care which is inconsistent with what the parties have agreed in
their contract. As to this kind of limitation, it is not apparent that U.S. courts entirely refuse to
impose tortious duty of care which is inconsistent with what the parties have agreed in their
contract. However, it is submitted that courts will not let the plaintiffs suing in tort to get around
the exculpatory clause that they voluntarily agree to allocate their risks in particular to the risk
arising from their negligent conduct. As for this reason, I would also propose that it would be
fair, just and reasonable if U.S. courts apparently adopt and apply this kind of limitation to
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restrict concurrent tort claim in U.S. jurisdictions. This is because U.S. law clearly recognizes
freedom of contract doctrine. To sustain such doctrine, the court should not give the plaintiff
rights under tort law that leads to the severe violation of the fundamental rule of contract which
has the dominant aim to protect the contracting parties’ bargain of interest in allocation of their
particular risk in the particular way so far as their interest is not outweighed by the mandatory
law or public policy.
Thirdly, it is also suggested by scholars’ views that the doctrine of efficient breach
recognized in U.S. contract law should be taken into account in limiting the imposition of tort
liability on the breaching party particularly in commercial transaction bound by the persons who
are in the crucial role on the development of economic. As to economic perspective, if breaching
party can prove that nonperformance is economically efficient, it is socially acceptable.
Therefore, the party in efficient breach of contract should not be punished by his breach.
Recognizing tort claim that puts more burdensome on the breaching party in the case where
efficient breach occurs would lead to the destruction of well-established concept of efficient
breach and also bring about the unreasonable consequences. Therefore, I would suggest that
U.S. courts should take such economic perspective as a factor being considered in permitting
concurrent tort claim in order to protect public economic interest in general. However, there is
also the view that tort liability may be imposed to prevent an opportunistic breach of contract.
One evidence of this view is the recognition of bad faith breach of insurance contract cases.
Therefore, I would suggest that the concept of bad faith breach should not be limited only in an
insurance contract. This is because U.S. law essentially recognizes that every contract contains
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. If the parties to the other kinds of contracts
can prove that there exists special relationship between them, tortious liability should be allowed
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when it appears that one party do something which injures the right of the other in order to
receive the benefits of the agreement. As the U.S. courts have already provided that special
relationship in bad faith breach of contract case is characterized by the elements of public
interest, adhesion, and fiduciary responsibility, courts could consider such factors to find the
similar characteristic of relationship in other contracts as well.
Lastly, in English jurisdiction, although courts generally allow the plaintiff to rely on tort
claim, some courts have a tendency to limit the scope of recoverable damages in concurrent tort
claim by applying the similar test of remoteness of the breach of contract claim to the tort claim.
If this approach is prevalent in the most of concurrent cases, the difference in the remoteness test
of damage between contract action and tort action will no longer affects the plaintiff’s choice of
claim. I think this restrictive approach aims at the protection of the parties’ expectation interest
rather than deterrence the wrongful conduct. As for such reason, I would suggest that the
limitation on the scope of recoverable damages is justifiable only in the case where the tortious
duty exists by virtue of a contract. This means that in the case where the duty mainly exists by
the virtue of provision under a statute or the case where the duty exists independently of
contractual terms, the court should apply the independent set of remoteness rule of tort
irrespective of the consequence of the application of remoteness rule of contract. This is because
in such cases tortious duty is imposed by law itself and also arises independently from the
contractual duty. Allowing the plaintiff to take advantage of the more generous rules for
remoteness of damage available in tort does not create an unreasonable or undue intrusion of
contracting parties’ expectation interest. Therefore, for the sake of certainty and consistency,
English courts should distinguish the precise fact situations in which concurrent tortious liability
has arisen and apply an appropriate remoteness rules to that particular factual situation.
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In conclusion, the plaintiff’s right to remedies in tort claim is generally recognized in
U.S. and English systems. The existence of contractual relationship cannot entirely preclude the
plaintiff from the protection under tort law. However, some limitations on concurrent tort claim
are also necessary not only to sustain the fundamental and crucial rule of contract but also to
prevent an undue intrusion into the bargain-relationship by tort- a theory of non-consensual
liability.
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